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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · IN, KY, OH
The read
$1.5B of CMBS across 63 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 16.5% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($375M, 26% of the book). 46 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (3,911 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Cincinnati's filed distress climbs past 16%, and the real strain lands in 2029
Cincinnati carries $1.5 billion of CMBS across 63 loans, and the filed record has turned the wrong way: 16.5% of the book sat in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent as of July 2026, a rate that has been rising. That is a notable number against a median DSCR of 1.65 across the market — the headline cushion looks fine, but the distress is concentrated rather than diffuse. On the bank side, 2 of 19 lenders tracked here are flagged distressed, with another 4 on early warning.
The maturity calendar tells you where the pressure gathers. The heaviest load lands in 2029, with $375 million coming due — 26% of the entire book in a single year — and smaller walls of roughly $0.2 billion each in 2028, 2030 and 2033. By sector, office and retail each anchor about $0.4 billion, with hospitality and multifamily at $0.2 billion apiece; retail here shows a 0.0% filed distress rate, inside the 2.6% national mark, while office nationally runs at 11.1%.
The on-the-ground record is active: 46 distress events over the past year, split between 12 store closures and 34 layoff notices accounting for 3,911 jobs. That sits against a local labor backdrop that reads tighter than the filed loan data — unemployment of 3.6% as of August 2026, down 0.7 points year over year. For desks underwriting this metro, the read is a strong-DSCR book with a visible concentration of trouble and a 2029 bunching that dominates the refinancing picture.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$240M / 16.5%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$313M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
2 / 19
Bank Early-Warning
4 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
12
Layoff Notices (1y)
34 / 3,911 jobs
0.40% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
63 / $1.5B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.6%
-0.7pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN right now?
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN currently shows 3 of 4 signals elevated — store closures, WARN layoff notices, and securitized loans in special servicing are all hot — while bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line reads quiet. Notably, the 3 pairs both elevated and 3 pairs disagreeing split the six pair readings evenly, with 0 pairs both quiet. The store closures leg is elevated by size, not by rate: it ranks 34th of 392 metros by count but 230th by rate per 100k jobs (1.34 closures per 100,000 jobs), a fork the data flags explicitly. WARN notices rank 34th of 386 by count and 114th by rate (0.2% of employment). The CMBS leg is the strongest per-unit signal: 16.49% of the securitized balance read here sits in special servicing, ranking 21st of 335 by count and 27th by rate. The bank leg, at 0.24% of allocated CRE over the noncurrent line (rank 187th of 393 by count, 319th by rate), remains quiet — but its allocation by branch deposits is a caveat since only 6.8% of dollars sit at single-metro banks. Disagreements here reflect mechanism, not error: closures-hot with bank-quiet reads as "tenants are leaving and no lender balance sheet shows it yet," and WARN-hot with bank-quiet reads as "employment is going before any lender books it." The CMBS-bank split — tape hot, bank cold — points to national capital stress no local lender is carrying. Three pair agreements (closures-WARN, closures-CMBS, WARN-CMBS) all read hot, reinforcing that the stress is real across property-level and employment feeds, even as the lender-side picture lags.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
13 closures | 1.34 per 100k jobs | 34 of 392 | 230 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
20 notices | 0.2% | 34 of 386 | 114 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$77.0mm | 0.24% | 187 of 393 | 319 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
9 loan records | 16.49% | 21 of 335 | 27 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 969,487 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 1,145,931 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $32,307.3 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $1,455.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 17140 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN, and which cannot be read?
In Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN, the elevated distress signals are concentrated in CMBS special servicing, ground-level closures, and WARN notices. Specifically, the CMBS special servicing UPB is $240.0mm, representing a 16.5% share of metro UPB, with 9 loans in special servicing. Additionally, there are 13 store closures and 20 WARN notices over the past year. However, bank-side distress is not readable: the share of bank CRE at the 90th percentile is 8.6%, total bank CRE is $32.31bn (with a 6.8% allocation), and distressed lender CRE is $77.0mm (distressed bank assets: 0.3). The convergence score is 3, signaling a confirmed phase with leading and realized credit signals firing together.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $240.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 16.5%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $32.31bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 8.6%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $77.0mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.30bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 6.8%
- Signals reading elevated
- CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 9
- Distressed banks
- 2
- Store closures (past year)
- 13
- WARN notices (past year)
- 20
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 17140 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.6%
-0.7pp yr
Last 24 months
3.1%5.0%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 969,487 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 16.5% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.9% — $154M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+10.6pp
… and loan size held fixed
+10.1pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+11.2pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Hospitality: 11 loans, $183M, where the same type runs 6.0% elsewhere. Its own rate and its part of the gap are not shown: fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$313M — 21% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 16.5% now (2026-07), +2.7pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.1B of the metro's $1.5B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$313M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 30 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$2.5B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.12× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$2.5B
After Committed Draws
$1.7B / −32%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.12×
Banks In Footprint
30 / 2 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.1B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $819M
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.7B,
with 6 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $259M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
11 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 30 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Financial Bank OH | 38.5% | 169% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.91% |
| Union Savings Bank OH | 45.3% | 128% total 128%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| The North Side Bank And Trust Company OH | 100.0% | 156% total 259%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Republic Bank & Trust Company KY | 7.6% | 125% total 186%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| The Harrison Building And Loan Association OH | 100.0% | 107% total 137%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Valley Central Bank OH | 100.0% | 122% total 184%
|
🔒 | 3.47% |
| First Commonwealth Bank PA | 4.9% | 205% total 260%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Stock Yards Bank & Trust Company KY | 10.5% | 248% total 359%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| The Park National Bank OH | 3.8% | 197% total 270%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| 1st National Bank OH | 99.1% | 133% total 203%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| The Friendship State Bank IN | 39.9% | 113% total 171%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Civista Bank OH | 16.0% | 261% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.63% |
| First State Bank OH | 20.7% | 183% total 201%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| Fcn Bank, National Association IN | 70.8% | 247% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Cincinnatus Savings & Loan Co. OH | 100.0% | 201% total 238%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| Central Bank & Trust Co. KY | 12.0% | 261% total 333%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| German American Bank IN | 2.9% | 222% total 306%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| Forcht Bank, National Association KY | 28.7% | 249% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Merchants National Bank OH | 10.3% | 149% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Community Savings Bank OH | 68.9% | 136% total 152%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Heritage Bank, Inc. KY | 100.0% | 295% total 403%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First National Bank Of Kentucky KY | 24.0% | 186% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Cfbank, National Association OH | 9.0% | 279% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.53% |
| Community Trust Bank, Inc. KY | 0.2% | 165% total 206%
|
🔒 | 0.39% |
| Farmers & Merchants Bank OH | 8.1% | 240% total 432%
|
🔒 | 1.56% |
| The Farmers & Merchants State Bank OH | 0.7% | 231% total 374%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Peoples Exchange Bank KY | 1.8% | 246% total 359%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Riverhills Bank OH | 100.0% | 493% total 567%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| Lcnb National Bank OH | 67.3% | 386% total 492%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| The First National Bank Of Williamson WV | 0.0% | 108% total 165%
|
🔒 | 1.01% |
Not counted — 19 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
U.s. Bank National Association OH · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · The Huntington National Bank OH · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Truist Bank NC · Keybank National Association OH · Guardian Savings Bank OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Miami Savings Bank OH · Bath State Bank IN · Warsaw Federal Savings And Loan Association OH · Somerville Bank OH · Southern Hills Community Bank OH · The Farmers State Bank OH
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valley Central Bank | $70M | 122% total 184%
|
3.47% | 🔒 |
| Fifth Third Bank, National Association | $33.6B | 68% total 106%
|
0.77% | 🔒 |
| 1st National Bank | $54M | 133% total 203%
|
0.17% | 🔒 |
| The North Side Bank And Trust Company | $367M | 156% total 259%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| U.s. Bank National Association | $50.7B | 57% total 70%
|
1.12% | 🔒 |
| First Financial Bank | $5.0B | 169% total 215%
|
0.91% | 🔒 |
| Spring Valley Bank | $64M | 102% total 165%
|
0.24% | 🔒 |
| Lcnb National Bank | $1.1B | 386% total 492%
|
0.23% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Cincinnati's banks appear to have ample capacity to refinance the metro's visible maturing CRE: 30 banks qualify for the room calculation, and with $297.9mm maturing against $1.71bn of room after committed draws, the wall-to-room ratio is 0.17 — below the median of 0.24, ranking it 160 of 275 from the most strained, a slack reading. Two caveats temper this: the wall covers $1.46bn of CMBS maturing within 24 months rather than the metro's whole maturity load, so the ratio is an upper bound on local-bank absorption, and 4 banks are excluded from the room.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $297.9mm
- … across this many loans
- 17
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $2.53bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.08bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.71bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.17
- Rank, most strained
- 160
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.12
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 30
- … excluded from the calculation
- 4
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 16.5%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.46bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.17 is BELOW the median of 0.24, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
160 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 17140 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
46 local distress events in the past year (3,911 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Cincinnati
2026-10-01
LAYOFF
91 jobs · Middletown/Butler
2026-09-11
LAYOFF
56 jobs · Cincinnati/Hamilton
2026-09-11
LAYOFF
56 jobs · Cincinnati/Hamilton
2026-09-10
CLOSURE
West Chester
2026-09-09
LAYOFF
116 jobs · Mount Orab/Brown
2026-09-09
LAYOFF
116 jobs · Mount Orab/Brown
2026-09-08
LAYOFF
73 jobs · Boone
2026-08-30
LAYOFF
303 jobs · Boone
2026-08-06
LAYOFF
66 jobs · West Chester/Butler
2026-08-06
LAYOFF
66 jobs · West Chester/Butler
2026-08-04
LAYOFF
488 jobs · Cincinnati/Hamilton
2026-08-04
LAYOFF
488 jobs · Cincinnati/Hamilton
2026-08-03
LAYOFF
56 jobs · Cincinnati/Hamilton
2026-07-31
CLOSURE
Cincinnati
What has actually happened on the ground in Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN recently?
Over the trailing 365-day window in Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN, the vetted readings show 34 WARN notices, 12 store closures, and 2 CRE-likely bankruptcies, with jobs affected at 3,911 — though that jobs figure is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute zero. Note that the bankruptcy count is a state proxy, counting filings in the states where the metro's collateral sits rather than a metro-native count, and the closure and layoff figures are ZIP-matched to the CBSA with only approved rows counted.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 12
- WARN layoff notices
- 34
- Jobs on those notices
- 3,911
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 2
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 17140 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.