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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · IL, IN
The read
$8.2B of CMBS across 366 loans. Office is both the largest book ($2.2B) and the most distressed (33.6% vs 11.1% national). Distress is rising in the filed record — 14.9% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($1.5B). 180 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (15,299 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office carries Chicago's distress, and the filed record keeps climbing
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin sits on $8.2 billion of CMBS across 366 loans, and the pressure is concentrated where the exposure is largest. Office is both the metro's biggest book at $2.2 billion and its most troubled, with a 33.6% distress rate against an 11.1% national mark for the sector — a gap of more than three times the country. The all-in metro distress rate stands at 15.2%, and the filed record has been rising, printing 14.9% as of July 2026. Median DSCR across the book is 1.74, but the office tail is doing the damage.
The maturity calendar keeps the question open. The heaviest load lands in 2029 at $1.5 billion, carrying a 9.1% distress rate, with another $1.3 billion in 2031 and $1.1 billion in 2030 behind it. Nearer in, the 2028 vintage is smaller at $1.0 billion but already running hot at 26.0%, and $2.0 billion comes due inside the next 24 months. Beyond office, the other sectors run above their national benchmarks without approaching office's severity: multifamily at 9.8% versus 7.9%, retail at 7.4% versus 2.6%, and industrial at 9.0% versus 2.7%.
The ground-level record adds to the picture. The metro logged 180 on-the-ground distress events over the past year — 88 store closures and 92 layoff notices covering 15,299 jobs — while unemployment sat at 5.2% in August 2026, up 0.7 point year over year. Among the 88 banks with local exposure, nine are flagged distressed and another 25 carry early-warning signals.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$1.2B / 15.2%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$2.0B
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
9 / 88
Bank Early-Warning
25 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
88
Layoff Notices (1y)
92 / 15,299 jobs
0.39% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
366 / $8.2B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
5.2%
+0.7pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN right now?
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN is showing broad-based distress across all four tracked metrics, with all 6 of 6 possible pairwise comparisons registering elevated readings and none quiet or disagreeing. Store closures are markedly elevated at 83 closures (2.11 per 100,000 jobs, ranked 3rd of 392 by count and 157th by rate), and WARN layoff notices are similarly hot at 100 notices (0.31% of employment, 7th of 386 by count, 68th by rate). Bank CRE over the noncurrent line stands at $2,956.9mm (2.42% rate, 22nd of 393 by count) — but this leg is elevated by size rather than by rate, falling below the median of its own rate ranking, so its prominence reflects the metro's scale rather than per-unit stress. Securitized loans in special servicing are at 47 rows (14.35% rate, 3rd of 335 by count). The unanimous agreement across these pairs — including the tightest pairing between store closures and CMBS special servicing, both measured at the property — points to genuine, mechanism-driven stress rather than any single feed artifact, though the bank leg's allocation by branch deposits (only 24.5% of dollars at single-metro lenders) warrants caution on that one reading.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
83 closures | 2.11 per 100k jobs | 3 of 392 | 157 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
100 notices | 0.31% | 7 of 386 | 68 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$2.96bn | 2.42% | 22 of 393 | 233 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
47 loan records | 14.35% | 3 of 335 | 34 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 3,931,489 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 4,717,450 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $122,041.6 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $8,454.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 16980 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN, and which cannot be read?
In Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN, the elevated distress signals are credit- and real-economy driven: distressed bank CRE exposure is at a 90th percentile of 16.8%, with $2.96bn held at distressed local banks, while CMBS special servicing stands at $1.21bn (a 14.3% share of metro UPB). Ground-level stress is also firing, with 83 store closures and 100 WARN notices in the past year. The reading on the bank allocation exact share is 24.5% and total bank CRE is $122.04bn; distress is confirmed at "peak" phase. The only unavailable reading is the explicit count of CMBS loans in special servicing or the distressed bank asset total in billions — those figures are not provided in the stated data.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $1.21bn
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 14.3%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $122.04bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 16.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $2.96bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $5.70bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 24.5%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 47
- Distressed banks
- 11
- Store closures (past year)
- 83
- WARN notices (past year)
- 100
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
$1B+ of CRE in special servicing or held at distressed local banks
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 16980 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
5.2%
+0.7pp yr
Last 24 months
4.2%5.6%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 3,931,489 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 15.2% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.3% — $728M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 5 of 6 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+8.9pp
… and loan size held fixed
+8.8pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+8.5pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 54 loans, $2.2B, running 33.6% where the same type runs 10.4% elsewhere — worth 6.3pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$2.0B — 24% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 14.9% now (2026-07), +3.3pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $3.8B of the metro's $8.2B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$2.0B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 88 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$30.9B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.06× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$30.9B
After Committed Draws
$22.4B / −28%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.06×
Banks In Footprint
88 / 18 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $9.8B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $8.5B
comes out of the room above, leaving $22.4B,
with 28 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $1.3B of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
4 of 88
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
13 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 88 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cibc Bank Usa IL | 95.2% | 149% total 196%
|
🔒 | 1.24% |
| Byline Bank IL | 99.3% | 129% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.89% |
| Lake Forest Bank & Trust Company, National Association IL | 96.8% | 112% total 141%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Wintrust Bank, National Association IL | 100.0% | 211% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Barrington Bank & Trust Company, National Association IL | 100.0% | 107% total 127%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Old Second National Bank IL | 99.1% | 192% total 267%
|
🔒 | 1.21% |
| Hinsdale Bank & Trust Company, National Association IL | 100.0% | 164% total 197%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Wheaton Bank & Trust, National Association IL | 100.0% | 117% total 157%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| First American Bank IL | 75.1% | 159% total 178%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Northbrook Bank And Trust Company, National Association IL | 100.0% | 178% total 192%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Village Bank And Trust, National Association IL | 100.0% | 128% total 164%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Old Plank Trail Community Bank, National Association IL | 100.0% | 144% total 180%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| St. Charles Bank & Trust Company, National Association IL | 75.3% | 136% total 186%
|
🔒 | 1.46% |
| Signature Bank IL | 100.0% | 156% total 210%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Libertyville Bank & Trust Company, National Association IL | 100.0% | 179% total 221%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| First Financial Bank OH | 12.4% | 169% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.91% |
| State Bank Of The Lakes, National Association IL | 87.7% | 139% total 182%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Centier Bank IN | 81.0% | 265% total 318%
|
🔒 | 1.52% |
| Schaumburg Bank & Trust Company, National Association IL | 100.0% | 160% total 190%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Beverly Bank & Trust Company, National Association IL | 100.0% | 186% total 206%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Crystal Lake Bank And Trust Company, National Association IL | 100.0% | 185% total 220%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Federal Savings Bank IL | 100.0% | 148% total 148%
|
🔒 | 1.17% |
| First Merchants Bank IN | 9.5% | 183% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Republic Bank Of Chicago IL | 100.0% | 227% total 265%
|
🔒 | 2.20% |
| Hoyne Savings Bank IL | 100.0% | 120% total 125%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| First Eagle Bank IL | 100.0% | 155% total 186%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| American Community Bank & Trust IL | 100.0% | 169% total 370%
|
🔒 | 1.67% |
| Home State Bank, National Association IL | 100.0% | 176% total 280%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Belmont Bank & Trust Company IL | 95.1% | 205% total 356%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Cornerstone National Bank & Trust Company IL | 100.0% | 211% total 402%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Grundy Bank IL | 100.0% | 108% total 169%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Heartland Bank And Trust Company IL | 29.5% | 262% total 321%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| International Bank Of Chicago IL | 92.9% | 238% total 334%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Resource Bank, National Association IL | 95.7% | 207% total 284%
|
🔒 | 2.71% |
| Itasca Bank & Trust Co. IL | 100.0% | 214% total 348%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Secure State Bank IL | 100.0% | 136% total 262%
|
🔒 | 0.98% |
| First Community Bank And Trust IL | 100.0% | 109% total 173%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Brickyard Bank IL | 100.0% | 114% total 337%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Horizon Bank IN | 10.1% | 235% total 331%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| First State Bank IL | 25.5% | 208% total 301%
|
🔒 | 0.80% |
| American Community Bank Of Indiana IN | 100.0% | 209% total 403%
|
🔒 | 2.22% |
| Peoples Bank IN | 100.0% | 283% total 408%
|
🔒 | 0.77% |
| Time Bank IL | 77.6% | 246% total 312%
|
🔒 | 3.16% |
| First Bank Of Manhattan IL | 100.0% | 182% total 237%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Harvard State Bank IL | 74.5% | 165% total 303%
|
🔒 | 0.52% |
| Kentland Bank IN | 75.0% | 215% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Midland States Bank IL | 9.5% | 261% total 333%
|
🔒 | 1.61% |
| First Federal Savings Bank IL | 32.1% | 129% total 179%
|
🔒 | 1.17% |
| Sterling Bank MO | 12.0% | 195% total 227%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| Grand Ridge National Bank IL | 89.3% | 257% total 497%
|
🔒 | 0.75% |
| Community State Bank IN | 89.0% | 135% total 167%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Waterman Bank IL | 100.0% | 217% total 246%
|
🔒 | 4.07% |
| Community Bank Of Elmhurst IL | 100.0% | 215% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| American Commercial Bank & Trust, National Association IL | 36.4% | 274% total 528%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| Midland Federal Savings And Loan Association IL | 100.0% | 139% total 162%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Servbank, National Association IL | 42.7% | 281% total 343%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Fnbc Bank & Trust IL | 100.0% | 276% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Osb Community Bank IL | 20.0% | 174% total 238%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| Alliance Bank IN | 22.9% | 218% total 284%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Sauk Valley Bank & Trust Company IL | 7.7% | 126% total 221%
|
🔒 | 1.07% |
| Trustbank IL | 8.7% | 160% total 307%
|
🔒 | 0.29% |
| Bank Of Pontiac IL | 3.7% | 166% total 222%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| First Mid Bank & Trust, National Association IL | 1.7% | 271% total 350%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| American Bank And Trust Company, National Association IA | 11.0% | 215% total 342%
|
🔒 | 0.75% |
| First Nations Bank IL | 100.0% | 295% total 444%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| North Shore Bank WI | 1.5% | 250% total 265%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| American Metro Bank IL | 100.0% | 281% total 430%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Town Center Bank IL | 100.0% | 294% total 419%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Federated Bank IL | 3.2% | 122% total 154%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Prairie Community Bank IL | 100.0% | 297% total 474%
|
🔒 | 1.58% |
| Amalgamated Bank Of Chicago IL | 100.0% | 386% total 510%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| Forest Park National Bank And Trust Company IL | 100.0% | 412% total 560%
|
🔒 | 3.68% |
| Devon Bank IL | 100.0% | 306% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Marquette Bank IL | 100.0% | 576% total 587%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Albank National Association IL | 100.0% | 344% total 364%
|
🔒 | 1.06% |
| First Bank Chicago IL | 100.0% | 318% total 360%
|
🔒 | 0.76% |
| Lakeside Bank IL | 100.0% | 491% total 577%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| First Secure Bank And Trust Co. IL | 100.0% | 367% total 472%
|
🔒 | 6.51% |
| Pan American Bank & Trust IL | 100.0% | 401% total 553%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| First Secure Community Bank IL | 100.0% | 309% total 380%
|
🔒 | 4.62% |
| American Eagle Bank IL | 100.0% | 411% total 464%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Providence Bank & Trust IL | 100.0% | 346% total 484%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Millennium Bank IL | 100.0% | 444% total 608%
|
🔒 | 4.56% |
| Peoplefirst Bank IL | 100.0% | 333% total 452%
|
🔒 | 0.14% |
| Parkway Bank And Trust Company IL | 94.5% | 433% total 452%
|
🔒 | 1.52% |
| State Bank Of Texas TX | 14.6% | 484% total 484%
|
🔒 | 2.18% |
| Cibm Bank IL | 3.8% | 319% total 421%
|
🔒 | 0.94% |
| United Fidelity Bank, Fsb IN | 1.3% | 430% total 434%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
Not counted — 54 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bmo Bank National Association IL · The Northern Trust Company IL · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Citibank, National Association SD · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · The Huntington National Bank OH · Liberty Bank For Savings IL · Lisle Savings Bank IL · 1st Source Bank IN · First Savings Bank Of Hegewisch IL · North Shore Trust And Savings IL · Demotte State Bank IN · Fwbank IL · Central Federal Savings And Loan Association IL · First State Bank Of Porter IN · Beal Bank Usa NV · United Trust Bank IL · First Independence Bank MI · Hometown National Bank IL · Fowler State Bank IN · Tbk Bank, Ssb TX · Bank Of Wolcott IN · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Old National Bank IN · Associated Bank, National Association WI · First National Bank Of Omaha NE · Busey Bank IL · Western Alliance Bank AZ · Cathay Bank CA · Bank Of Hope CA · Royal Business Bank CA · Armed Forces Bank, National Association KS · Liberty Bank And Trust Company LA · Woodforest National Bank TX · Capital Bank, National Association MD · Hanmi Bank CA · Valley National Bank NJ · Amg National Trust Bank CO
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Community Savings Bank IL · First Bank And Trust Company Of Illinois IL · Burling Bank IL · Central Savings, F.s.b. IL · Union National Bank And Trust Company Of Elgin IL · The State Bank Of Geneva IL · 1st Equity Bank IL · Smartbiz Bank, National Association IL · First National Bank Of Brookfield IL · Heritage Bank Of Schaumburg IL
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Secure Bank And Trust Co. | $207M | 367% total 472%
|
6.51% | 🔒 |
| First Secure Community Bank | $196M | 309% total 380%
|
4.62% | 🔒 |
| Millennium Bank | $472M | 444% total 608%
|
4.56% | 🔒 |
| Time Bank | $261M | 246% total 312%
|
3.16% | 🔒 |
| Burling Bank | $88M | 133% total 272%
|
7.30% | 🔒 |
| First Bank And Trust Company Of Illinois | $99M | 156% total 262%
|
4.12% | 🔒 |
| Waterman Bank | $55M | 217% total 246%
|
4.07% | 🔒 |
| Forest Park National Bank And Trust Company | $171M | 412% total 560%
|
3.68% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin reads as slack: its banks_qualifying of 88 regional and community lenders hold room_after_committed of $22.37bn against a CMBS wall of only $2.07bn maturing across 101 loans, giving a wall_to_room of 0.09 — below the 0.24 median and ranking 210 of 275 from most strained — though with banks_excluded_here at 25 and a 15.1% distressed share, and given that the wall is CMBS-only and room is a deposit-footprint proxy, this is an upper-bound reading of whether that maturity load needs local bank absorption.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $2.07bn
- … across this many loans
- 101
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $30.91bn
- Committed construction draws
- $9.80bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $22.37bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.09
- Rank, most strained
- 210
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.07
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 88
- … excluded from the calculation
- 25
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 15.1%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $8.20bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.09 is BELOW the median of 0.24, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
210 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 16980 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
180 local distress events in the past year (15,299 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Chicago
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Chicago
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Deerfield
2026-10-13
CLOSURE
Bolingbrook
2026-10-13
LAYOFF
40 jobs · Chicago
2026-10-08
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
CLOSURE
Bolingbrook
2026-10-02
LAYOFF
121 jobs · Schaumburg
2026-09-25
LAYOFF
61 jobs · Arlington Heights
2026-09-24
CLOSURE
Joliet
2026-09-23
CLOSURE
Batavia
2026-09-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-09-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-09-22
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-09-21
LAYOFF
92 jobs · Itasca
What has actually happened on the ground in Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN metro's on-the-ground activity shows 88 store closures and 92 WARN notices, with 15,299 jobs affected — a figure that should be read as a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. CRE-likely bankruptcy filings tied to the states where this metro's collateral sits total 17, though that is a state-level proxy rather than a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 88
- WARN layoff notices
- 92
- Jobs on those notices
- 15,299
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 17
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 16980 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.