Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · AL, IL, IN
The read
$8.3B of CMBS across 368 loans. Office is both the largest book ($2.2B) and the most distressed (33.4% vs 11.3% national). Distress is rising in the filed record — 14.8% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($1.5B). 205 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (14,765 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Chicago's Office Book Carries the Distress, and the Record Is Turning
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin carries $8.3 billion of CMBS across 368 loans, and the strain is concentrated where it hurts most. Office is both the metro's largest book, at $2.2 billion, and its most distressed, with a 33.4% distress rate against an 11.3% national mark for the sector — a gap that is difficult to look past. Retail and industrial also run hot relative to the country, at 7.4% and 9.4% versus 2.7% nationally, but neither approaches office's dominance of the problem. Across the full book, the distress rate stands at 15.1%.
The filed record has been rising. Distress reached 14.8% as of July 2026, and the direction in the data is up, even as the median DSCR across the book holds at 1.72. The maturity wall is still ahead: the heaviest load lands in 2029 at $1.5 billion, carrying a 9.1% distress rate, while the smaller $1.0 billion coming due in 2028 already prints at 25.6% distressed. Nearly $1.9 billion matures inside the next 24 months.
Beneath the loan tape, the on-the-ground record shows 205 distress events over the past year — 106 store closures and 99 layoff notices totaling 14,765 jobs. Metro unemployment sits at 4.9% as of July 2026, up 0.2 percentage points year over year. Among 89 banks, 9 are flagged as distressed and 25 sit on early-warning watch.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$1.2B / 15.1%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.9B
Local Banks (stressed)
9 / 89
Bank Early-Warning
25 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
106
Layoff Notices (1y)
99 / 14,765 jobs
0.38% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
368 / $8.3B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.9%
+0.2pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN right now?
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN is showing broad-based distress across all four tracked metrics, with all 6 of 6 possible pairwise comparisons registering elevated readings and none quiet or disagreeing. Store closures are markedly elevated at 83 closures (2.11 per 100,000 jobs, ranked 3rd of 392 by count and 157th by rate), and WARN layoff notices are similarly hot at 100 notices (0.31% of employment, 7th of 386 by count, 68th by rate). Bank CRE over the noncurrent line stands at $2,956.9mm (2.42% rate, 22nd of 393 by count) — but this leg is elevated by size rather than by rate, falling below the median of its own rate ranking, so its prominence reflects the metro's scale rather than per-unit stress. Securitized loans in special servicing are at 47 rows (14.35% rate, 3rd of 335 by count). The unanimous agreement across these pairs — including the tightest pairing between store closures and CMBS special servicing, both measured at the property — points to genuine, mechanism-driven stress rather than any single feed artifact, though the bank leg's allocation by branch deposits (only 24.5% of dollars at single-metro lenders) warrants caution on that one reading.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
83 closures | 2.11 per 100k jobs | 3 of 392 | 157 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
100 notices | 0.31% | 7 of 386 | 68 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$2.96bn | 2.42% | 22 of 393 | 233 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
47 loan records | 14.35% | 3 of 335 | 34 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 3931489, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 4717450, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 122041.6, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 8454.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 16980 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN, and which cannot be read?
In Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN, the elevated distress signals are credit- and real-economy driven: distressed bank CRE exposure is at a 90th percentile of 16.8%, with $2.96bn held at distressed local banks, while CMBS special servicing stands at $1.21bn (a 14.3% share of metro UPB). Ground-level stress is also firing, with 83 store closures and 100 WARN notices in the past year. The reading on the bank allocation exact share is 24.5% and total bank CRE is $122.04bn; distress is confirmed at "peak" phase. The only unavailable reading is the explicit count of CMBS loans in special servicing or the distressed bank asset total in billions — those figures are not provided in the stated data.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $1.21bn
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 14.3%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $122.04bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 16.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $2.96bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $5.70bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 24.5%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 47
- Distressed banks
- 11
- Store closures (past year)
- 83
- WARN notices (past year)
- 100
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
$1B+ of CRE in special servicing or held at distressed local banks
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 16980 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.9%
+0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
4.2%5.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 3,931,489 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 15.1% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.3% — $727M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 5 of 7 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+8.8pp
… and loan size held fixed
+8.7pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+8.4pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 56 loans, $2.2B, running 33.4% where the same type runs 10.6% elsewhere — worth 6.2pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.9B — 23% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 14.8% now (2026-07), +3.4pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $3.7B of the metro's $8.3B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.9B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 86 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$17.9B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.10× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$17.9B
After Committed Draws
$13.4B / −25%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.10×
Banks In Footprint
86 / 18 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $5.7B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $4.5B
comes out of the room above, leaving $13.4B,
with 27 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $1.2B of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
4 of 86
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
13 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 86 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Byline Bank IL | 99.2% | 129% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.89% |
| Lake Forest Bank & Trust Company, National Association IL | 97.0% | 112% total 141%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Wintrust Bank, National Association IL | 100.0% | 211% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Barrington Bank & Trust Company, National Association IL | 100.0% | 107% total 127%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Old Second National Bank IL | 98.9% | 192% total 267%
|
🔒 | 1.21% |
| Hinsdale Bank & Trust Company, National Association IL | 100.0% | 164% total 197%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Wheaton Bank & Trust, National Association IL | 100.0% | 117% total 157%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| First American Bank IL | 74.7% | 159% total 178%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Northbrook Bank And Trust Company, National Association IL | 100.0% | 178% total 192%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Associated Bank, National Association WI | 12.1% | 183% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Village Bank And Trust, National Association IL | 100.0% | 128% total 164%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Old Plank Trail Community Bank, National Association IL | 100.0% | 144% total 180%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| St. Charles Bank & Trust Company, National Association IL | 79.7% | 136% total 186%
|
🔒 | 1.46% |
| Signature Bank IL | 100.0% | 156% total 210%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Libertyville Bank & Trust Company, National Association IL | 100.0% | 179% total 221%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| State Bank Of The Lakes, National Association IL | 85.5% | 139% total 182%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Centier Bank IN | 80.7% | 265% total 318%
|
🔒 | 1.52% |
| Schaumburg Bank & Trust Company, National Association IL | 100.0% | 160% total 190%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Beverly Bank & Trust Company, National Association IL | 100.0% | 186% total 206%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Merchants Bank IN | 10.2% | 183% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Crystal Lake Bank And Trust Company, National Association IL | 100.0% | 185% total 220%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Federal Savings Bank IL | 100.0% | 148% total 148%
|
🔒 | 1.17% |
| Republic Bank Of Chicago IL | 100.0% | 227% total 265%
|
🔒 | 2.20% |
| Hoyne Savings Bank IL | 100.0% | 120% total 125%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| First Financial Bank OH | 7.6% | 169% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.91% |
| First Eagle Bank IL | 100.0% | 155% total 186%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| American Community Bank & Trust IL | 100.0% | 169% total 370%
|
🔒 | 1.67% |
| Home State Bank, National Association IL | 100.0% | 176% total 280%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Belmont Bank & Trust Company IL | 96.8% | 205% total 356%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Cornerstone National Bank & Trust Company IL | 100.0% | 211% total 402%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Grundy Bank IL | 100.0% | 108% total 169%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Heartland Bank And Trust Company IL | 28.8% | 262% total 321%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| International Bank Of Chicago IL | 92.4% | 238% total 334%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Resource Bank, National Association IL | 95.8% | 207% total 284%
|
🔒 | 2.71% |
| Itasca Bank & Trust Co. IL | 100.0% | 214% total 348%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Secure State Bank IL | 100.0% | 136% total 262%
|
🔒 | 0.98% |
| First Community Bank And Trust IL | 100.0% | 109% total 173%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Brickyard Bank IL | 100.0% | 114% total 337%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Horizon Bank IN | 9.5% | 235% total 331%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| First State Bank IL | 23.4% | 208% total 301%
|
🔒 | 0.80% |
| American Community Bank Of Indiana IN | 100.0% | 209% total 403%
|
🔒 | 2.22% |
| Peoples Bank IN | 100.0% | 283% total 408%
|
🔒 | 0.77% |
| Time Bank IL | 74.6% | 246% total 312%
|
🔒 | 3.16% |
| First Bank Of Manhattan IL | 100.0% | 182% total 237%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Harvard State Bank IL | 74.4% | 165% total 303%
|
🔒 | 0.52% |
| Kentland Bank IN | 74.3% | 215% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Midland States Bank IL | 8.7% | 261% total 333%
|
🔒 | 1.61% |
| First Federal Savings Bank IL | 31.1% | 129% total 179%
|
🔒 | 1.17% |
| Grand Ridge National Bank IL | 88.8% | 257% total 497%
|
🔒 | 0.75% |
| Community State Bank IN | 87.6% | 135% total 167%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Sterling Bank MO | 10.6% | 195% total 227%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| Waterman Bank IL | 100.0% | 217% total 246%
|
🔒 | 4.07% |
| Community Bank Of Elmhurst IL | 100.0% | 215% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| American Commercial Bank & Trust, National Association IL | 35.5% | 274% total 528%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| Midland Federal Savings And Loan Association IL | 100.0% | 139% total 162%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Fnbc Bank & Trust IL | 100.0% | 276% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Osb Community Bank IL | 21.0% | 174% total 238%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| Alliance Bank IN | 22.3% | 218% total 284%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Sauk Valley Bank & Trust Company IL | 7.3% | 126% total 221%
|
🔒 | 1.07% |
| First Mid Bank & Trust, National Association IL | 2.3% | 271% total 350%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Trustbank IL | 7.7% | 160% total 307%
|
🔒 | 0.29% |
| Bank Of Pontiac IL | 3.0% | 166% total 222%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| American Bank And Trust Company, National Association IA | 9.2% | 215% total 342%
|
🔒 | 0.75% |
| First Nations Bank IL | 100.0% | 295% total 444%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| American Metro Bank IL | 100.0% | 281% total 430%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| North Shore Bank WI | 1.4% | 250% total 265%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| Town Center Bank IL | 100.0% | 294% total 419%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Prairie Community Bank IL | 100.0% | 297% total 474%
|
🔒 | 1.58% |
| Amalgamated Bank Of Chicago IL | 100.0% | 386% total 510%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| Forest Park National Bank And Trust Company IL | 100.0% | 412% total 560%
|
🔒 | 3.68% |
| Devon Bank IL | 100.0% | 306% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Marquette Bank IL | 100.0% | 576% total 587%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Albank National Association IL | 100.0% | 344% total 364%
|
🔒 | 1.06% |
| First Bank Chicago IL | 100.0% | 318% total 360%
|
🔒 | 0.76% |
| Lakeside Bank IL | 100.0% | 491% total 577%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| First Secure Bank And Trust Co. IL | 100.0% | 367% total 472%
|
🔒 | 6.51% |
| Pan American Bank & Trust IL | 100.0% | 401% total 553%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| First Secure Community Bank IL | 100.0% | 309% total 380%
|
🔒 | 4.62% |
| American Eagle Bank IL | 100.0% | 411% total 464%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Providence Bank & Trust IL | 100.0% | 346% total 484%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Millennium Bank IL | 100.0% | 444% total 608%
|
🔒 | 4.56% |
| Peoplefirst Bank IL | 100.0% | 333% total 452%
|
🔒 | 0.14% |
| Parkway Bank And Trust Company IL | 91.8% | 433% total 452%
|
🔒 | 1.52% |
| State Bank Of Texas TX | 14.5% | 484% total 484%
|
🔒 | 2.18% |
| Cibm Bank IL | 4.1% | 319% total 421%
|
🔒 | 0.94% |
| United Fidelity Bank, Fsb IN | 1.1% | 430% total 434%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
Not counted — 54 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bmo Bank National Association IL · The Northern Trust Company IL · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Citibank, National Association SD · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · U.s. Bank National Association OH · The Huntington National Bank OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Liberty Bank For Savings IL · Lisle Savings Bank IL · 1st Source Bank IN · First Savings Bank Of Hegewisch IL · North Shore Trust And Savings IL · Demotte State Bank IN · Fwbank IL · Central Federal Savings And Loan Association IL · First State Bank Of Porter IN · United Trust Bank IL · Tbk Bank, Ssb TX · Hometown National Bank IL · Fowler State Bank IN · Bank Of Wolcott IN · Beal Bank Usa NV · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Cibc Bank Usa IL · Old National Bank IN · First National Bank Of Omaha NE · Busey Bank IL · Western Alliance Bank AZ · Cathay Bank CA · Bank Of Hope CA · Royal Business Bank CA · Armed Forces Bank, National Association KS · Liberty Bank And Trust Company LA · Woodforest National Bank TX · Capital Bank, National Association MD · Hanmi Bank CA · Valley National Bank NJ · Amg National Trust Bank CO
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Community Savings Bank IL · First Bank And Trust Company Of Illinois IL · Burling Bank IL · Central Savings, F.s.b. IL · Servbank, National Association IL · Union National Bank And Trust Company Of Elgin IL · The State Bank Of Geneva IL · 1st Equity Bank IL · Smartbiz Bank, National Association IL · First National Bank Of Brookfield IL · Heritage Bank Of Schaumburg IL
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Secure Bank And Trust Co. | $207M | 367% total 472%
|
6.51% | 🔒 |
| First Secure Community Bank | $196M | 309% total 380%
|
4.62% | 🔒 |
| Millennium Bank | $472M | 444% total 608%
|
4.56% | 🔒 |
| Time Bank | $261M | 246% total 312%
|
3.16% | 🔒 |
| Burling Bank | $88M | 133% total 272%
|
7.30% | 🔒 |
| First Bank And Trust Company Of Illinois | $99M | 156% total 262%
|
4.12% | 🔒 |
| Waterman Bank | $55M | 217% total 246%
|
4.07% | 🔒 |
| Forest Park National Bank And Trust Company | $171M | 412% total 560%
|
3.68% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin has the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE, with the local bank room-to-wall ratio sitting in the slack band. The CMBS wall of $1.88bn across 93 loans equals just 0.14 of the $13.43bn in room remaining after committed draws — well below the median reading of 0.20 among ranked metros. Even before accounting for the $5.73bn in committed draws, the ratio is only 0.10 against a pre-commitment room of $17.94bn. The banks qualifying here number 86, with 26 excluded; the strain reading of 169 of 270 is not an artifact of exclusion, and the 15.2% distressed share on the $8.19bn CMBS UPB remains manageable.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.88bn
- … across this many loans
- 93
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $17.94bn
- Committed construction draws
- $5.73bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $13.43bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.14
- Rank, most strained
- 169
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.10
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 86
- … excluded from the calculation
- 26
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 15.2%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $8.19bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.14 is BELOW the median of 0.20, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
169 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 16980 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
205 local distress events in the past year (14,765 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Chicago
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Chicago
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Deerfield
2026-09-04
LAYOFF
Blue Island
2026-09-02
CLOSURE
Whiting
2026-09-02
LAYOFF
363 jobs · Chicago
2026-09-02
LAYOFF
109 jobs · Chicago
2026-09-01
CLOSURE
Lombard
2026-09-01
LAYOFF
63 jobs · Bloomingdale
2026-08-25
LAYOFF
97 jobs · Romeoville
2026-08-21
CLOSURE
Crystal Lake
2026-08-10
CLOSURE
Glenview
2026-08-10
CLOSURE
Chicago
2026-08-10
CLOSURE
Chicago
2026-08-10
LAYOFF
116 jobs · Chicago
What has actually happened on the ground in Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN recently?
On the ground in Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN over the past 365 days, the metro has recorded 83 store closures and 97 WARN notices, affecting 14,302 jobs (a floor, as notices without a headcount contribute zero). Additionally, 3 CRE-likely bankruptcies were filed, though this figure is a state proxy, not a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 83
- WARN layoff notices
- 97
- Jobs on those notices
- 14,302
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 3
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 16980 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.