Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Charleston-North Charleston, SC
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · SC
The read
$755M of CMBS across 30 loans. Nothing in this book is distressed today; Retail is the largest exposure at $425M. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2033 ($275M, 36% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 16 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,033 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
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The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
A Clean Book in the Lowcountry, With the Reckoning Set for 2033
Charleston-North Charleston carries $755M of CMBS across 30 loans, and as of July 2026 none of it is distressed — a flat 0.0% in the filed record, with a median debt-service coverage ratio of 2.04. Retail is the heaviest concentration at $425M, and it sits clean against a national retail distress rate of 2.7%. This is a small, well-covered book, and the servicer ledger shows no cracks.
The timing is what merits attention. The largest maturity load does not land soon: only about $0.1B comes due inside 24 months, while $275M — 36% of the book — matures in 2033. That pushes the metro's refinancing test years out, with the intervening 2029, 2031 and 2027 vintages carrying lighter, and so far clean, balances.
Beneath the paper, the on-the-ground record has more texture. The past year brought 16 distress events — eight store closures and eight layoff notices — accounting for 1,033 jobs. Local unemployment stood at 3.7% in June 2026, down 0.1 point on the year, even as office-using employment of 71,840 ran 1.7% lower year over year. The loans remain current; the street-level signal is the one to watch.
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$85M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 3
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
8
Layoff Notices (1y)
8 / 1,033 jobs
0.32% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
30 / $755M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.7%
-0.3pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
71,840
-1.7% yr
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.7%
-0.3pp yr
Last 24 months
3.0%4.7%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 320,427 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 4.7% — $36M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-4.7pp
… and loan size held fixed
-5.0pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-2.8pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 3 loans, $114M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 11.3% elsewhere — worth 1.7pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$85M — 11% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), -0.8pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $587M of the metro's $755M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$85M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 13 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$257M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.33× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$257M
After Committed Draws
$125M / −51%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.33×
Banks In Footprint
13 / 2 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $256M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $131M
comes out of the room above, leaving $125M,
with 7 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $124M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
2 of 13
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
7 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 13 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Bank Of South Carolina SC | 100.0% | 149% total 216%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Southern First Bank SC | 19.3% | 236% total 397%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| Beacon Community Bank SC | 100.0% | 252% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Reliance Bank SC | 18.8% | 206% total 337%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Enterprise Bank Of South Carolina SC | 11.8% | 126% total 212%
|
🔒 | 0.34% |
| Ameris Bank GA | 0.8% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| The Citizens Bank SC | 3.5% | 102% total 178%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of The Lowcountry SC | 17.1% | 254% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| First Palmetto Bank SC | 4.9% | 266% total 409%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| First Bank NC | 0.3% | 280% total 366%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Anderson Brothers Bank SC | 0.6% | 268% total 380%
|
🔒 | 0.33% |
| First Capital Bank SC | 87.7% | 342% total 434%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| South Atlantic Bank SC | 14.5% | 334% total 461%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
Not counted — 23 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Truist Bank NC · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Td Bank, National Association DE · Farmers And Merchants Bank Of South Carolina SC · Regions Bank AL · First National Bank Of South Carolina SC · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · The Huntington National Bank OH · 1st Federal Savings Bank Of Sc, Inc. SC · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Pinnacle Bank TN · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · First Horizon Bank TN · United Community Bank SC · First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · Woodforest National Bank TX · Encore Bank AR · United Bank VA · Servisfirst Bank AL
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Bank Of South Carolina | $141M | 149% total 216%
|
0.47% | 🔒 |
| Beacon Community Bank | $294M | 252% total 325%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| First Capital Bank | $534M | 342% total 434%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-29Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+3.5%
Same-Store Revenue
+3.1%
Occupancy
95.9%
Rent Growth
+1.9%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAA | +3.5% | +3.1% | 95.9% | +1.9% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
16 local distress events in the past year (1,033 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-07-21
CLOSURE
James Island
2026-05-21
LAYOFF
58 jobs · Berkeley
2026-05-11
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-05-01
LAYOFF
39 jobs · Charleston
2026-04-13
LAYOFF
122 jobs · Charleston
2026-03-16
LAYOFF
78 jobs · Dorchester
2026-02-28
LAYOFF
194 jobs · Charleston
2026-02-28
LAYOFF
133 jobs · Charleston
2026-02-28
LAYOFF
194 jobs · Charleston
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Goose Creek
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Charleston
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Charleston
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Moncks Corner
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Saint George
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Summerville
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.