Start free trial
No credit card required
Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Charleston-North Charleston, SC
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · SC
The read
$736M of CMBS across 29 loans. Nothing in this book is distressed today; Retail is the largest exposure at $443M. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2033 ($275M, 37% of the book). 14 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (818 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
A Clean Book, With the Noise Coming From the Street
Charleston-North Charleston carries $736M of CMBS across 29 loans, and on the securitized side the book is quiet: nothing here is distressed today — no loan in special servicing, none 60-plus days delinquent. Retail is the dominant exposure at $443M, and it carries a zero distress rate against a national retail mark of 2.6%. That is a clean read, and it is worth stating plainly rather than hedging it.
The maturity wall sits well out in time. The heaviest load lands in 2033, where $275M — 37% of the book — comes due, far beyond the near-term refinancing crunch pressing on other metros. For now, the question of how this paper reprices is a 2030s problem, not a 2026 one.
Where the pressure shows up is on the ground. The metro logged 14 distress events over the past year — seven store closures and seven layoff notices, accounting for 818 jobs. That is the real-economy signal running underneath an otherwise untroubled loan book, and it is the line to watch even as the filed credit record stays clean.
Written 2026-10-21
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$85M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 3
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
7
Layoff Notices (1y)
7 / 818 jobs
0.26% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
29 / $736M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.7%
-0.5pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
71,840
-1.7% yr
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.7%
-0.5pp yr
Last 24 months
3.0%4.7%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 320,427 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 4.5% — $33M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-4.5pp
… and loan size held fixed
-4.8pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-2.4pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 3 loans, $114M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 11.1% elsewhere — worth 1.7pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$85M — 12% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $569M of the metro's $736M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$85M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 14 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$268M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.32× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$268M
After Committed Draws
$128M / −52%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.32×
Banks In Footprint
14 / 2 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $271M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $140M
comes out of the room above, leaving $128M,
with 8 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $132M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
2 of 14
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
8 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 14 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Bank Of South Carolina SC | 100.0% | 149% total 216%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Southern First Bank SC | 21.0% | 236% total 397%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| Beacon Community Bank SC | 100.0% | 252% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Reliance Bank SC | 20.0% | 206% total 337%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Enterprise Bank Of South Carolina SC | 13.0% | 126% total 212%
|
🔒 | 0.34% |
| Ameris Bank GA | 0.9% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| The Citizens Bank SC | 3.3% | 102% total 178%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of The Lowcountry SC | 19.5% | 254% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| First Palmetto Bank SC | 5.3% | 266% total 409%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Townebank VA | 0.1% | 249% total 345%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| First Bank NC | 0.5% | 280% total 366%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Anderson Brothers Bank SC | 0.6% | 268% total 380%
|
🔒 | 0.33% |
| First Capital Bank SC | 91.0% | 342% total 434%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| South Atlantic Bank SC | 15.7% | 334% total 461%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
Not counted — 24 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Truist Bank NC · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Td Bank, National Association DE · Farmers And Merchants Bank Of South Carolina SC · Regions Bank AL · First National Bank Of South Carolina SC · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · The Huntington National Bank OH · Commerce Bank MO · 1st Federal Savings Bank Of Sc, Inc. SC · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Pinnacle Bank TN · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · United Community Bank SC · First Horizon Bank TN · First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · Woodforest National Bank TX · Encore Bank AR · United Bank VA · Servisfirst Bank AL
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Bank Of South Carolina | $141M | 149% total 216%
|
0.47% | 🔒 |
| Beacon Community Bank | $294M | 252% total 325%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| First Capital Bank | $534M | 342% total 434%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Charleston-North Charleston, SC have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
The Charleston-North Charleston, SC metro has capacity to absorb its maturing CRE wall: banks_qualifying is 14 against banks_excluded_here of 9, and the $85.2mm maturing across 4 maturing_loans stands at a wall_to_room of 0.67, i.e. 0.32 on a wall_to_room_before_committed_draws basis, with room_after_committed of $128.0mm (from room_before_committed of $267.6mm after committed_draws of $271.3mm) — noting the wall is CMBS-only against a $736.2mm cmbs_upb and room is a deposit-footprint proxy, so the ratio is an upper bound on the local absorption burden.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $85.2mm
- … across this many loans
- 4
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $267.6mm
- Committed construction draws
- $271.3mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $128.0mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.67
- Rank, most strained
- 73
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.32
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 14
- … excluded from the calculation
- 9
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $736.2mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.67 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
73 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 16700 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-29Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+3.5%
Same-Store Revenue
+3.1%
Occupancy
95.9%
Rent Growth
+1.9%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAA | +3.5% | +3.1% | 95.9% | +1.9% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
14 local distress events in the past year (818 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-14
CLOSURE
Summerville
2026-07-21
CLOSURE
James Island
2026-05-21
LAYOFF
58 jobs · Berkeley
2026-05-11
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-05-01
LAYOFF
39 jobs · Charleston
2026-04-13
LAYOFF
122 jobs · Charleston
2026-03-16
LAYOFF
78 jobs · Dorchester
2026-02-28
LAYOFF
194 jobs · Charleston
2026-02-28
LAYOFF
194 jobs · Charleston
2026-02-28
LAYOFF
133 jobs · Charleston
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Saint George
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Summerville
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Charleston
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Goose Creek
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Moncks Corner
What has actually happened on the ground in Charleston-North Charleston, SC recently?
Over the trailing 365 window, the Charleston-North Charleston, SC metro shows 7 store closures and 7 WARN notices affecting 818 jobs — the latter a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. CRE-likely bankruptcies register at 1, though this is a STATE PROXY rather than a metro-native count. The reading is unavailable for any metro-specific on-the-ground detail beyond these figures.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 7
- WARN layoff notices
- 7
- Jobs on those notices
- 818
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 1
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 16700 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.