Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Bridgeport-Stamford-Danbury, CT
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CT
The read
$1.2B of CMBS across 40 loans. Office is both the largest book ($593M) and the most distressed (28.5% vs 11.3% national). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2027 ($335M, 29% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 14.0% as of 2026-07. 16 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (103 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office carries the book, and 2027 is where the weight sits
Bridgeport-Stamford-Danbury runs $1.2 billion of CMBS across 40 loans, and office does the double duty that defines this metro: it is both the largest book at $593 million and the most distressed, at 28.5% against an 11.3% national office rate. That is more than two and a half times the national mark on the sector that matters most here — a concentration that leaves little room to look past the segment.
The maturity calendar puts the pressure point in plain view. The heaviest load lands in 2027, at $335 million, or 29% of the book — a larger single-year concentration than any other rung on the ladder. For a metro whose distress is already anchored in office, that 2027 stack is the number desks will keep coming back to.
For now, the filed record is holding steady: distress reads 14.0% as of July 2026, flat rather than climbing. Off the tape, the on-the-ground record shows 16 distress events over the past year, tied to 103 jobs — a modest but real signal beneath a headline rate that has not moved.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$169M / 14.6%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$450M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 0
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
13
Layoff Notices (1y)
3 / 103 jobs
0.03% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
40 / $1.2B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.5%
+1.3pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
101,559
-7.2% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Bridgeport-Stamford-Danbury, CT right now?
Bridgeport-Stamford-Danbury, CT shows a mixed distress picture: 2 of 4 signals are elevated, though one of those is driven by metro size rather than per-unit stress. Store closures are elevated at 1.95 per 100k jobs (rank 58 of 392 by count, 176 by rate), while WARN notices are quiet at 0.02% of employment (rank 166 of 386 by count, 220 by rate). Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is elevated at $585.1mm (rank 52 of 393 by count, 218 by rate) but flagged as size-driven — the rate of 2.86% sits below the median. CMBS special servicing is quiet at 14.13% of balance (rank 52 of 335 by count, 35 by rate). Of 6 pairs, 4 disagree, 1 agrees hot, and 1 agrees quiet — the disagreement pattern (closures hot, WARN quiet) suggests failure below the WARN filing floor among small operators.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
7 closures | 1.95 per 100k jobs | 58 of 392 | 176 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
2 notices | 0.02% | 166 of 386 | 220 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$585.1mm | 2.86% | 52 of 393 | 218 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
3 loan records | 14.13% | 52 of 335 | 35 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 359661, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 475562, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 20443.3, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 1196.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14860 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Bridgeport-Stamford-Danbury, CT, and which cannot be read?
Key distress signals are elevated in Bridgeport-Stamford-Danbury, CT: bank-distressed CRE exposure is at $585.1mm, and the share of metro bank CRE at risk is 16.2% (90th percentile), while CMBS special servicing sits at $169.0mm (14.1% of metro UPB). In addition, closures are a stated elevated signal (7 store closures over 1y), though the CRE-credit phase is "early" and materiality is "modest" ($585.1mm distressed CRE, no distressed bank assets in $bn). The reading that cannot be obtained: the 90th-percentile bank CRE at-risk share is 16.2%, but the bank allocation share of 9.6% is provided; however, the bank_cre_at_risk_p90 is stated as 16.2%, which is available. No figures are absent — the key unavailable item is the count of distressed banks (0, stated as 0 so readable) and the convergence reading (2), which is stated. Thus, all figures are readable; no reading is unavailable.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $169.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 14.1%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $20.44bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 16.2%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $585.1mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 9.6%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 3
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 7
- WARN notices (past year)
- 2
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14860 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.5%
+1.3pp yr
Last 24 months
2.9%5.7%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 359,661 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 14.6% distressed where its own property mix predicts 7.8% — $79M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+6.8pp
… and loan size held fixed
+6.5pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+6.2pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 17 loans, $593M, running 28.5% where the same type runs 11.1% elsewhere — worth 8.9pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$450M — 39% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 14.0% now (2026-07), +0.4pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $902M of the metro's $1.2B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$450M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 13 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$2.6B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.17× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$2.6B
After Committed Draws
$1.5B / −43%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.17×
Banks In Footprint
13 / 4 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.5B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.1B
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.5B,
with 4 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $394M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
2 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 13 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Webster Bank, National Association CT | 44.4% | 256% total 287%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| Ives Bank CT | 88.8% | 155% total 212%
|
🔒 | 2.74% |
| Newtown Savings Bank CT | 72.0% | 122% total 178%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Fairfield County Bank CT | 100.0% | 224% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| Dr Bank CT | 100.0% | 131% total 154%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Connecticut Community Bank, National Association CT | 69.4% | 127% total 203%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Fieldpoint Private Bank & Trust CT | 85.1% | 257% total 330%
|
🔒 | 1.66% |
| Patriot Bank, National Association CT | 88.9% | 289% total 374%
|
🔒 | 2.34% |
| The Milford Bank CT | 9.3% | 137% total 238%
|
🔒 | 0.36% |
| First County Bank CT | 100.0% | 369% total 468%
|
🔒 | 0.14% |
| Bankwell Bank CT | 89.1% | 331% total 549%
|
🔒 | 0.66% |
| The First Bank Of Greenwich CT | 84.3% | 367% total 486%
|
🔒 | 0.66% |
| Union Savings Bank CT | 76.5% | 336% total 381%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
Not counted — 13 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Citibank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Td Bank, National Association DE · The Northern Trust Company IL · Keybank National Association OH · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Capital One, National Association VA · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
No locally-headquartered banks in our FDIC data for this metro.
Do the banks lending in Bridgeport-Stamford-Danbury, CT have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
The banks lending in Bridgeport-Stamford-Danbury, CT appear to have slack capacity to refinance its maturing commercial real estate. With a maturing wall of $449.7mm against $1.47bn in available room after committed draws, the wall-to-room ratio stands at 0.31, positioning this metro 112 of 270 ranked from most strained — a reading above the median of 0.20 but still well below a binding threshold. However, the 14.6% distressed share and the fact that only 13 banks qualify versus 2 excluded here suggest modest credit stress and a possible dependency on lenders whose footprints aren't captured in this measure. Still, the uncompressed room of $2.57bn underscores that these banks retain substantial headroom, even after accounting for the $1.49bn in committed construction draws.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $449.7mm
- … across this many loans
- 11
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $2.57bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.49bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.47bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.31
- Rank, most strained
- 112
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.17
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 13
- … excluded from the calculation
- 2
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 14.6%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.16bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.31 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
112 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14860 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
16 local distress events in the past year (103 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-07
LAYOFF
Norwalk
2026-07-23
CLOSURE
Brookfield
2026-07-15
CLOSURE
Stamford
2026-07-15
CLOSURE
Stamford
2026-07-15
CLOSURE
Stamford
2026-06-20
CLOSURE
Trumbull
2026-06-20
CLOSURE
Trumbull
2026-06-20
CLOSURE
Trumbull
2026-04-07
CLOSURE
Norwalk
2026-02-28
CLOSURE
Westport
2026-02-13
LAYOFF
44 jobs · Southport
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Brookfield
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Norwalk
2025-11-30
CLOSURE
Norwalk
2025-10-24
LAYOFF
59 jobs · Westport
What has actually happened on the ground in Bridgeport-Stamford-Danbury, CT recently?
In the Bridgeport-Stamford-Danbury, CT metro over the past 365 days, the data shows 2 WARN notices affecting 103 jobs and 7 store closures, with 0 CRE-likely bankruptcies recorded. However, these figures come with important caveats: the bankruptcy count is a state proxy (not metro-native), the job total is a floor since notices without headcounts contribute 0 jobs, and closures only include approved rows. No reading is available for any additional on-the-ground metrics beyond these figures.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 7
- WARN layoff notices
- 2
- Jobs on those notices
- 103
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14860 · geo_events · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.