Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · MA, NH
The read
$5.9B of CMBS across 88 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($1.3B). Mixed-Use is the largest book ($2.7B, 0.0% distressed). Distress is flat in the filed record — 3.2% as of 2026-07. 104 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (5,413 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Boston's Book Holds Firm, but the Office Line Runs Hot
Boston-Cambridge-Newton carries $5.9 billion of CMBS across 88 loans, and the filed record has stayed flat — a 3.2% distress rate as of July 2026, with a median DSCR of 1.77 across the book. The largest concentration is Mixed-Use at $2.7 billion, and none of it is distressed, a clean contrast to the 5.0% national rate for the sector. Retail ($0.6 billion) and Multifamily ($0.2 billion) show the same 0.0% reading against national marks of 2.7% and 7.6%.
The exception is Office, and it runs hot. On a $1.4 billion book, distress sits at 11.6% — a touch above the 11.3% national rate. That is the pressure point in an otherwise composed metro. On the maturity ladder, the heaviest load lands in 2029 at $1.3 billion, followed by $1.1 billion in 2030 and $1.0 billion in 2028; every one of those vintages reads 0.0% distressed today, and $1.4 billion comes due inside 24 months.
The on-the-ground signal is the loudest part of the file: 104 distress events over the past year — 41 store closures and 63 layoff notices — touching 5,413 jobs. That sits alongside a lender picture of 58 banks, 3 distressed and 12 flagged for early warning, in a metro where office-using employment of 731,636 is down 1.6% year over year.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$194M / 3.3%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.4B
Local Banks (stressed)
3 / 58
Bank Early-Warning
12 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
41
Layoff Notices (1y)
63 / 5,413 jobs
0.23% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
88 / $5.9B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.3%
-0.2pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
731,636
-1.6% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH right now?
Based on the four vetted feeds, Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH shows measurable distress, with three of the four legs elevated: store closures at 43 closures (1.79 per 100k jobs), layoff notices at 66 notices (0.2% of employment), and bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line at $10,326.4mm (11.78% of the lent book). The securitized tape is the quiet leg, with 2 rows in special servicing (3.32% of the balance read here). Of the six pairwise comparisons, three show both sides elevated and three show disagreement — the disagreements are structural, not severity: closures hot with the tape quiet reads as retail failing on buildings the tape does not hold; WARN hot with the tape quiet reads as employers cutting while the securitized book has not moved; and bank hot with the tape quiet reads as lenders stressed on a book the tape cannot see. No reading is unavailable; all four legs are measured or allocated, with the bank leg's allocation caveat noted (only 38.5% of those dollars sit at single-metro banks).
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
43 closures | 1.79 per 100k jobs | 10 of 392 | 192 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
66 notices | 0.2% | 14 of 386 | 114 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$10.33bn | 11.78% | 6 of 393 | 51 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
2 loan records | 3.32% | 66 of 335 | 82 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 2404878, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 2715232, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 87652.0, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 5835.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14460 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH, and which cannot be read?
In Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH, the elevated distress signals are bank-distressed CRE, store closures, and WARN notices. The bank-side reading shows distressed lender CRE at $10.33bn (with banks holding 38.5% of CRE allocation and 21.5% at risk at the 90th percentile; distressed bank assets total 3.2), while ground-level stress includes 43 store closures and 66 WARN notices over one year. CMBS special servicing is minimal at $194.0mm (a 3.3% share of metro UPB), but the reading on CMBS loan count is unavailable; the overall phase is "peak" with confirmed sequencing, though materiality is "modest" given tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $194.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 3.3%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $87.65bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 21.5%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $10.33bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $3.20bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 38.5%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 3
- Store closures (past year)
- 43
- WARN notices (past year)
- 66
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14460 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.3%
-0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
3.5%4.8%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 2,404,878 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 3.3% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.2% — $172M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 4 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-2.9pp
… and loan size held fixed
-2.7pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-1.5pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Mixed-Use: 20 loans, $2.7B, running 0.0% where the same type runs 5.6% elsewhere — worth 2.6pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.4B — 24% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 3.2% now (2026-07), +0.3pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $3.4B of the metro's $5.9B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.4B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 65 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$8.8B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.16× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$8.8B
After Committed Draws
$4.8B / −45%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.16×
Banks In Footprint
65 / 18 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $7.8B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $4.0B
comes out of the room above, leaving $4.8B,
with 29 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $3.8B of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
6 of 65
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
21 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 65 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eastern Bank MA | 95.6% | 253% total 302%
|
🔒 | 0.72% |
| Institution For Savings In Newburyport And Its Vicinity MA | 100.0% | 128% total 150%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Middlesex Savings Bank MA | 90.8% | 196% total 224%
|
🔒 | 0.39% |
| Northern Bank & Trust Company MA | 100.0% | 181% total 236%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Rockland Trust Company MA | 73.2% | 276% total 351%
|
🔒 | 0.66% |
| Salem Five Cents Savings Bank MA | 100.0% | 251% total 295%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Leader Bank, National Association MA | 100.0% | 229% total 250%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Avidia Bank MA | 73.9% | 137% total 200%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| Mutualone Bank MA | 100.0% | 136% total 176%
|
🔒 | 8.60% |
| Main Street Bank MA | 85.4% | 153% total 213%
|
🔒 | 2.88% |
| Trunorth Bank MA | 100.0% | 260% total 314%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Dedham Institution For Savings MA | 100.0% | 252% total 279%
|
🔒 | 2.46% |
| Coastal Heritage Bank MA | 100.0% | 176% total 244%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| The Village Bank MA | 100.0% | 233% total 271%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Bank Of Canton MA | 100.0% | 190% total 217%
|
🔒 | 1.79% |
| North Easton Savings Bank MA | 45.3% | 162% total 222%
|
🔒 | 2.57% |
| Haverhill Bank MA | 100.0% | 131% total 207%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Salem Co-Operative Bank NH | 100.0% | 140% total 196%
|
🔒 | 0.31% |
| Pentucket Bank MA | 100.0% | 226% total 314%
|
🔒 | 1.23% |
| East Cambridge Savings Bank MA | 100.0% | 260% total 303%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| The Savings Bank MA | 100.0% | 223% total 241%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Commonwealth Co-Operative Bank MA | 100.0% | 107% total 109%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Webster Bank, National Association CT | 1.8% | 256% total 287%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| The Cooperative Bank MA | 100.0% | 193% total 289%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Marblehead Bank MA | 100.0% | 101% total 132%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| South Shore Bank MA | 100.0% | 279% total 352%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Dean Co-Operative Bank MA | 69.0% | 126% total 164%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Winter Hill Bank, Fsb MA | 100.0% | 188% total 199%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bankgloucester MA | 100.0% | 167% total 323%
|
🔒 | 7.60% |
| Safra National Bank Of New York NY | 1.8% | 102% total 102%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bluestone Bank MA | 61.9% | 269% total 326%
|
🔒 | 2.01% |
| Stonehambank, A Co-Operative Bank MA | 100.0% | 267% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.67% |
| Charles River Bank MA | 81.0% | 177% total 320%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Mountainone Bank MA | 38.4% | 259% total 322%
|
🔒 | 1.12% |
| Washington Savings Bank MA | 100.0% | 227% total 245%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Meredith Village Savings Bank NH | 5.2% | 108% total 177%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| Profile Bank NH | 53.3% | 185% total 236%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Reading Co-Operative Bank MA | 100.0% | 281% total 350%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Partners Bank Of New England ME | 11.6% | 214% total 267%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Newburyport Five Cents Savings Bank MA | 100.0% | 294% total 392%
|
🔒 | 2.53% |
| Unibank For Savings MA | 1.3% | 136% total 161%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bristol County Savings Bank MA | 0.9% | 169% total 244%
|
🔒 | 1.08% |
| Bangor Savings Bank ME | 1.6% | 243% total 307%
|
🔒 | 0.51% |
| Primary Bank NH | 6.1% | 253% total 380%
|
🔒 | 1.49% |
| Fidelity Co-Operative Bank MA | 13.0% | 278% total 326%
|
🔒 | 5.32% |
| The Camden National Bank ME | 1.1% | 261% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| Merrimack County Savings Bank NH | 0.5% | 155% total 227%
|
🔒 | 1.15% |
| Beacon Bank And Trust MA | 100.0% | 336% total 412%
|
🔒 | 0.82% |
| Cambridge Savings Bank MA | 100.0% | 339% total 361%
|
🔒 | 2.24% |
| Everett Co-Operative Bank MA | 100.0% | 463% total 495%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Needham Bank MA | 100.0% | 314% total 412%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Onelocal Bank MA | 100.0% | 320% total 372%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
| Middlesex Federal Savings, F.a. MA | 100.0% | 366% total 447%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Eagle Bank MA | 100.0% | 330% total 430%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Winchester Savings Bank MA | 100.0% | 390% total 425%
|
🔒 | 0.27% |
| The Lowell Five Cent Savings Bank MA | 95.8% | 331% total 388%
|
🔒 | 1.24% |
| Bank Of New England NH | 92.3% | 447% total 501%
|
🔒 | 1.78% |
| Hingham Institution For Savings MA | 86.3% | 525% total 552%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Kennebunk Savings Bank ME | 18.7% | 424% total 531%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Rollstone Bank & Trust MA | 15.9% | 341% total 422%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Northeast Community Bank NY | 11.3% | 501% total 501%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Mechanics Cooperative Bank MA | 8.4% | 314% total 388%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of New Hampshire NH | 7.2% | 354% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| Oneunited Bank MA | 3.5% | 609% total 611%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Baycoast Bank MA | 2.7% | 303% total 460%
|
🔒 | 2.15% |
Not counted — 35 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
State Street Bank And Trust Company MA · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Td Bank, National Association DE · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Cape Ann Savings Bank MA · Watertown Savings Bank MA · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Winchester Co-Operative Bank MA · Piscataqua Savings Bank NH · The National Grand Bank Of Marblehead MA · First Seacoast Bank NH · The Northern Trust Company IL · The Cape Cod Five Cents Savings Bank MA · Canton Co-Operative Bank MA · Wrentham Co-Operative Bank MA · Stoughton Co-Operative Bank MA · Methuen Co-Operative Bank MA · First American Trust, Fsb CA · Beal Bank Usa NV · The Bank Of New York Mellon NY · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA · Happen Bank, National Association UT · Goldman Sachs Bank Usa NY · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Santander Bank, N.a. DE · Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY · East West Bank CA · Cathay Bank CA
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
42 North Private Bank MA · Walpole Co-Operative Bank MA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bankgloucester | $117M | 167% total 323%
|
7.60% | 🔒 |
| State Street Bank And Trust Company | $2.3B | 11% total 11%
|
12.78% | 🔒 |
| Mutualone Bank | $463M | 136% total 176%
|
8.60% | 🔒 |
| Newburyport Five Cents Savings Bank | $674M | 294% total 392%
|
2.53% | 🔒 |
| Cambridge Savings Bank | $2.8B | 339% total 361%
|
2.24% | 🔒 |
| The Bank Of Canton | $266M | 190% total 217%
|
1.79% | 🔒 |
| Beacon Bank And Trust | $9.6B | 336% total 412%
|
0.82% | 🔒 |
| Trunorth Bank | $1.2B | 260% total 314%
|
0.40% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH shows slack capacity to refinance its maturing CMBS wall, ranking 115 of 270 metros from the most strained. The wall of $1.43bn across 23 maturing loans (with a $5.90bn total CMBS UPB and a 3.3% distressed share) equals 0.30 times the $4.78bn of room remaining after $7.81bn in committed draws. The ratio rises to 0.16 times room before committed draws when using the full $8.76bn headroom, underscoring the region’s relative comfort.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.43bn
- … across this many loans
- 23
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $8.76bn
- Committed construction draws
- $7.81bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $4.78bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.30
- Rank, most strained
- 115
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.16
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 65
- … excluded from the calculation
- 6
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 3.3%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $5.90bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.30 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
115 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14460 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+0.2%
Same-Store Revenue
+1.4%
Occupancy
96.1%
Rent Growth
+1.7%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVB | — | +0.7% | 95.7% | +1.4% | 2026-07-30 |
| EQR | -0.9% | +1.5% | 95.8% | +1.4% | 2026-04-28 |
| UDR | +1.4% | +2.1% | 96.7% | +2.3% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
104 local distress events in the past year (5,413 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-02
LAYOFF
96 jobs · Waltham
2026-08-25
CLOSURE
Londonderry
2026-08-24
LAYOFF
77 jobs · Littleton
2026-08-17
CLOSURE
Medford
2026-08-17
LAYOFF
229 jobs · Cambridge
2026-08-17
LAYOFF
229 jobs · Cambridge
2026-08-17
LAYOFF
59 jobs · Boston
2026-08-15
CLOSURE
Boston
2026-08-14
CLOSURE
Medford
2026-08-13
CLOSURE
Boston
2026-08-13
CLOSURE
Boston
2026-08-13
LAYOFF
15 jobs · Franklin
2026-08-13
LAYOFF
112 jobs · Franklin
2026-08-12
LAYOFF
20 jobs · Billerica
2026-08-11
LAYOFF
Cambridge
What has actually happened on the ground in Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH recently?
In the Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH metro over the past 365 days, on-the-ground distress has included 3 CRE-likely bankruptcy filings (state proxy, not metro-native), 62 WARN notices affecting at least 5,391 jobs (a floor, as notices without headcounts add 0), and 43 approved store closures matched to the metro’s ZIP codes. These figures reflect only vetted, approved rows—not the broader convergence board count—and exclude pending closures or layoffs under 10 people unless no headcount was stated.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 43
- WARN layoff notices
- 62
- Jobs on those notices
- 5,391
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 3
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14460 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.