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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · MA, NH
The read
$5.9B of CMBS across 82 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($1.3B). Mixed-Use is the largest book ($2.7B, 0.0% distressed). 115 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (4,842 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Boston's securitized book runs clean, but the street-level record keeps filling
Boston-Cambridge-Newton carries $5.9 billion of CMBS across 82 loans, and the securitized record here reads conspicuously calm. Mixed-Use is the metro's largest book at $2.7 billion and sits at 0.0% distressed, against a 5.4% national rate for the sector. Retail ($0.6 billion) and Multifamily ($0.2 billion) likewise show no distress, running below national marks of 2.6% and 7.9%. Office is the thinner exposure at $1.4 billion — a sector carrying 11.1% distress nationally — leaving the local book light where the national pain is heaviest.
The refinancing calendar is deferred rather than imminent. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 at $1.3 billion, followed by $1.1 billion in 2030 and $1.0 billion in 2028, with none of those cohorts currently showing distress. Among the 57 banks tracked in the metro, three are flagged distressed and another 11 sit in early-warning territory.
The divergence is on the ground. The metro logged 115 distress events over the past year — 54 store closures and 61 layoff notices — accounting for 4,842 jobs. That filed record stands apart from a CMBS book that, for now, shows no securitized distress across its largest sectors. Unemployment was 4.1% as of August 2026, down 0.3 point year over year, even as office-using employment of 731,636 slipped 1.6% over the same stretch.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
Not reported
fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate — the book size and loan count above are unaffected
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.4B
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
3 / 57
Bank Early-Warning
11 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
54
Layoff Notices (1y)
61 / 4,842 jobs
0.20% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
82 / $5.9B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.1%
-0.3pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
731,636
-1.6% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH right now?
Based on the four vetted feeds, Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH shows measurable distress, with three of the four legs elevated: store closures at 43 closures (1.79 per 100k jobs), layoff notices at 66 notices (0.2% of employment), and bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line at $10,326.4mm (11.78% of the lent book). The securitized tape is the quiet leg, with 2 rows in special servicing (3.32% of the balance read here). Of the six pairwise comparisons, three show both sides elevated and three show disagreement — the disagreements are structural, not severity: closures hot with the tape quiet reads as retail failing on buildings the tape does not hold; WARN hot with the tape quiet reads as employers cutting while the securitized book has not moved; and bank hot with the tape quiet reads as lenders stressed on a book the tape cannot see. No reading is unavailable; all four legs are measured or allocated, with the bank leg's allocation caveat noted (only 38.5% of those dollars sit at single-metro banks).
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
43 closures | 1.79 per 100k jobs | 10 of 392 | 192 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
66 notices | 0.2% | 14 of 386 | 114 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$10.33bn | 11.78% | 6 of 393 | 51 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
2 loan records | 3.32% | 66 of 335 | 82 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 2,404,878 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 2,715,232 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $87,652.0 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $5,835.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14460 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.1%
-0.3pp yr
Last 24 months
3.5%4.8%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 2,404,878 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Fewer than 3 loans here are distressed, too few for a distress rate to mean anything — so there is no rate to test against this metro's property mix. 0 of 3 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.4B — 24% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $3.4B of the metro's $5.9B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.4B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 63 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$8.6B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.17× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$8.6B
After Committed Draws
$4.7B / −46%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.17×
Banks In Footprint
63 / 18 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $7.4B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $3.9B
comes out of the room above, leaving $4.7B,
with 29 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $3.4B of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
6 of 63
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
21 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 63 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eastern Bank MA | 91.3% | 253% total 302%
|
🔒 | 0.72% |
| Institution For Savings In Newburyport And Its Vicinity MA | 100.0% | 128% total 150%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Middlesex Savings Bank MA | 90.7% | 196% total 224%
|
🔒 | 0.39% |
| Northern Bank & Trust Company MA | 100.0% | 181% total 236%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Rockland Trust Company MA | 74.2% | 276% total 351%
|
🔒 | 0.66% |
| Salem Five Cents Savings Bank MA | 100.0% | 251% total 295%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Leader Bank, National Association MA | 100.0% | 229% total 250%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Mutualone Bank MA | 100.0% | 136% total 176%
|
🔒 | 8.60% |
| Avidia Bank MA | 70.6% | 137% total 200%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| Main Street Bank MA | 87.1% | 153% total 213%
|
🔒 | 2.88% |
| Trunorth Bank MA | 100.0% | 260% total 314%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Dedham Institution For Savings MA | 100.0% | 252% total 279%
|
🔒 | 2.46% |
| North Easton Savings Bank MA | 48.3% | 162% total 222%
|
🔒 | 2.57% |
| Coastal Heritage Bank MA | 100.0% | 176% total 244%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| The Village Bank MA | 100.0% | 233% total 271%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Bank Of Canton MA | 100.0% | 190% total 217%
|
🔒 | 1.79% |
| Haverhill Bank MA | 100.0% | 131% total 207%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Salem Co-Operative Bank NH | 100.0% | 140% total 196%
|
🔒 | 0.31% |
| Pentucket Bank MA | 100.0% | 226% total 314%
|
🔒 | 1.23% |
| East Cambridge Savings Bank MA | 100.0% | 260% total 303%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| The Savings Bank MA | 100.0% | 223% total 241%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Webster Bank, National Association CT | 1.8% | 256% total 287%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| The Cooperative Bank MA | 100.0% | 193% total 289%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Marblehead Bank MA | 100.0% | 101% total 132%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| South Shore Bank MA | 100.0% | 279% total 352%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Dean Co-Operative Bank MA | 67.1% | 126% total 164%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Winter Hill Bank, Fsb MA | 100.0% | 188% total 199%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bankgloucester MA | 100.0% | 167% total 323%
|
🔒 | 7.60% |
| Safra National Bank Of New York NY | 1.5% | 102% total 102%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bluestone Bank MA | 61.5% | 269% total 326%
|
🔒 | 2.01% |
| Stonehambank, A Co-Operative Bank MA | 100.0% | 267% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.67% |
| Charles River Bank MA | 82.0% | 177% total 320%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Mountainone Bank MA | 33.4% | 259% total 322%
|
🔒 | 1.12% |
| Washington Savings Bank MA | 100.0% | 227% total 245%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Profile Bank NH | 57.3% | 185% total 236%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Reading Co-Operative Bank MA | 100.0% | 281% total 350%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Meredith Village Savings Bank NH | 4.7% | 108% total 177%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
| Partners Bank Of New England ME | 11.8% | 214% total 267%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Newburyport Five Cents Savings Bank MA | 100.0% | 294% total 392%
|
🔒 | 2.53% |
| Bangor Savings Bank ME | 2.1% | 243% total 307%
|
🔒 | 0.51% |
| Unibank For Savings MA | 1.3% | 136% total 161%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Fidelity Co-Operative Bank MA | 15.3% | 278% total 326%
|
🔒 | 5.32% |
| Primary Bank NH | 7.2% | 253% total 380%
|
🔒 | 1.49% |
| The Camden National Bank ME | 1.0% | 261% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| Merrimack County Savings Bank NH | 0.4% | 155% total 227%
|
🔒 | 1.15% |
| Cambridge Savings Bank MA | 100.0% | 339% total 361%
|
🔒 | 2.24% |
| Everett Co-Operative Bank MA | 100.0% | 463% total 495%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Onelocal Bank MA | 100.0% | 320% total 372%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
| Middlesex Federal Savings, F.a. MA | 100.0% | 366% total 447%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Winchester Savings Bank MA | 100.0% | 390% total 425%
|
🔒 | 0.27% |
| Needham Bank MA | 98.7% | 314% total 412%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| The Lowell Five Cent Savings Bank MA | 96.1% | 331% total 388%
|
🔒 | 1.24% |
| Eagle Bank MA | 92.4% | 330% total 430%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of New England NH | 91.6% | 447% total 501%
|
🔒 | 1.78% |
| Hingham Institution For Savings MA | 83.7% | 525% total 552%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Beacon Bank And Trust MA | 40.9% | 336% total 412%
|
🔒 | 0.82% |
| Kennebunk Savings Bank ME | 20.1% | 424% total 531%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Rollstone Bank & Trust MA | 16.4% | 341% total 422%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Northeast Community Bank NY | 11.9% | 501% total 501%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Mechanics Cooperative Bank MA | 8.8% | 314% total 388%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of New Hampshire NH | 7.3% | 354% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| Oneunited Bank MA | 3.8% | 609% total 611%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Baycoast Bank MA | 3.2% | 303% total 460%
|
🔒 | 2.15% |
Not counted — 36 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
State Street Bank And Trust Company MA · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Td Bank, National Association DE · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Cape Ann Savings Bank MA · Watertown Savings Bank MA · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Winchester Co-Operative Bank MA · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Piscataqua Savings Bank NH · The National Grand Bank Of Marblehead MA · First Seacoast Bank NH · The Northern Trust Company IL · The Cape Cod Five Cents Savings Bank MA · Canton Co-Operative Bank MA · Wrentham Co-Operative Bank MA · First American Trust, Fsb CA · Stoughton Co-Operative Bank MA · Methuen Co-Operative Bank MA · The Bank Of New York Mellon NY · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA · Happen Bank, National Association UT · Goldman Sachs Bank Usa NY · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Santander Bank, N.a. DE · Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY · East West Bank CA · Cathay Bank CA
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Commonwealth Co-Operative Bank MA · 42 North Private Bank MA · Walpole Co-Operative Bank MA · Business Bank, The VT
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bankgloucester | $117M | 167% total 323%
|
7.60% | 🔒 |
| State Street Bank And Trust Company | $2.3B | 11% total 11%
|
12.78% | 🔒 |
| Mutualone Bank | $463M | 136% total 176%
|
8.60% | 🔒 |
| Newburyport Five Cents Savings Bank | $674M | 294% total 392%
|
2.53% | 🔒 |
| Cambridge Savings Bank | $2.8B | 339% total 361%
|
2.24% | 🔒 |
| The Bank Of Canton | $266M | 190% total 217%
|
1.79% | 🔒 |
| Beacon Bank And Trust | $9.6B | 336% total 412%
|
0.82% | 🔒 |
| Northern Bank & Trust Company | $1.2B | 181% total 236%
|
0.22% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+0.2%
Same-Store Revenue
+1.4%
Occupancy
96.1%
Rent Growth
+1.7%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVB | — | +0.7% | 95.7% | +1.4% | 2026-07-30 |
| EQR | -0.9% | +1.5% | 95.8% | +1.4% | 2026-04-28 |
| UDR | +1.4% | +2.1% | 96.7% | +2.3% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
115 local distress events in the past year (4,842 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-26
CLOSURE
Cambridge
2026-10-23
CLOSURE
Somerville
2026-10-23
LAYOFF
Boston
2026-10-23
LAYOFF
Boston
2026-10-21
CLOSURE
Needham
2026-10-20
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-19
CLOSURE
Scituate
2026-10-15
LAYOFF
124 jobs · Cambridge
2026-10-01
CLOSURE
Boston
2026-10-01
LAYOFF
Boston
2026-09-30
CLOSURE
Hingham
2026-09-29
CLOSURE
Boston
2026-09-25
LAYOFF
53 jobs · Lawrence
2026-09-24
CLOSURE
Boston
2026-09-24
LAYOFF
214 jobs · Westwood
What has actually happened on the ground in Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH metro recorded 60 warn notices and 50 store closures, with 4,718 jobs affected—a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute zero jobs. CRE-likely bankruptcies stand at 8, though this is a state proxy rather than a metro-native count: cases are attributed to the filing district and SEC 8-Ks to the filer's state, not to where the property sits, and coverage widened on 2026-09-16 so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 50
- WARN layoff notices
- 60
- Jobs on those notices
- 4,718
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 8
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14460 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.