Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Boise City, ID
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · ID
The read
$555M of CMBS across 22 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2030 ($248M, 45% of the book). Nothing in this book is distressed today; Hospitality is the largest exposure at $164M. Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 7 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (146 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$91M
Local Banks (stressed)
1 / 2
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
4
Layoff Notices (1y)
3 / 146 jobs
0.04% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
22 / $555M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.3%
-0.2pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Boise City, ID right now?
For Boise City, ID, distress is mixed but skewed toward the lender side. Of the six paired readings, three are quiet on both legs and three disagree, with zero pairs elevated on both sides.
The bank CRE leg is the only elevated signal: $495.9 million of bank CRE sits over the noncurrent line, a 9.22% rate, ranking 64th of 393 metros by count and 75th by rate. The other three legs are quiet — store closures sit at 3 closures (0.89 per 100k jobs, rank 128th of 392), WARN notices at 4 notices (0.08% of employment, rank 113th of 386), and securitized loans in special servicing at 0 rows (0.0%, rank 220th of 335).
The three disagreements all share one pattern: bank stress without a visible tenant or employment cause. The reading across pairs is "bank stress without a visible tenant cause — look for construction or a rate reset, not vacancy," "lender stress with no employment event behind it," and "the lenders here are stressed on a book the tape cannot see." This suggests the distress is on the lending side, not the property or labor side — possibly a book of loans allocated here by branch deposits rather than one located at the buildings themselves.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
3 closures | 0.89 per 100k jobs | 128 of 392 | 274 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
4 notices | 0.08% | 113 of 386 | 180 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$495.9mm | 9.22% | 64 of 393 | 75 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
0 loan records | 0% | 220 of 335 | 220 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
3 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
1 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 336302, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 437706, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 5375.8, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 555.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14260 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Boise City, ID, and which cannot be read?
In Boise City, ID, the elevated distress signal is bank_distressed_cre, with distressed lender CRE at $495.9mm and bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile reaching 21.1%. However, the reading is unavailable for other key signals: the CMBS special servicing UPB is $0.0mm (with a 0.0% share of metro UPB), and the bank allocation exact share is 0.0% of $5.38bn in bank CRE. The overall phase is "watch," described as "an isolated signal, not a convergence," with materiality deemed "immaterial" — "little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals."
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $5.38bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 21.1%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $495.9mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $1.50bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 0.0%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line
- Legs agreeing
- 1
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 0
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 3
- WARN notices (past year)
- 4
an isolated signal, not a convergence
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14260 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.3%
-0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
3.0%4.0%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 336,302 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Too few CMBS loans here (22) to say whether this metro's rate is explained by its property mix — that comparison needs 25. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$91M — 16% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $441M of the metro's $555M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$91M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 9 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$595M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.15× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$595M
After Committed Draws
$377M / −37%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.15×
Banks In Footprint
9 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $253M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $217M
comes out of the room above, leaving $377M,
with 4 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $36M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
4 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 9 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| D. L. Evans Bank ID | 30.3% | 130% total 245%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Idaho First Bank ID | 73.5% | 169% total 241%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Washington Trust Bank WA | 11.4% | 216% total 310%
|
🔒 | 0.50% |
| Northwest Bank ID | 32.6% | 177% total 224%
|
🔒 | 5.26% |
| Banner Bank WA | 2.4% | 253% total 379%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| First Federal Savings Bank Of Twin Falls ID | 11.9% | 190% total 272%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Heritage Bank WA | 0.3% | 295% total 432%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| Sunwest Bank UT | 9.5% | 327% total 467%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| Bell Bank ND | 0.0% | 270% total 333%
|
🔒 | 0.29% |
Not counted — 14 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
U.s. Bank National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Keybank National Association OH · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Bank Of Eastern Oregon OR
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · First Interstate Bank MT · Glacier Bank MT · Columbia Bank OR · Nbh Bank CO · Wafd Bank WA
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Idaho Trust Bank ID
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Northwest Bank | $527M | 177% total 224%
|
5.26% | 🔒 |
| Idaho Trust Bank | $79M | 204% total 276%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Boise City, ID have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Boise City is in a slack capacity position, with a maturing CMBS wall of $91.4mm against regional/community bank room of $377.1mm after committed draws, producing a wall-to-room ratio of 0.24 — just above the median 0.20, ranking 125 of 270 from the most strained, though the distressed share reading is 0.0%. While banks here could absorb the wall with slack to spare, that ratio partly reflects an exclusion artifact: with 9 banks qualifying against 7 excluded, the capacity reading is driven by deposit footprint rather than total credit supply, and the CMBS wall itself may understate the metro’s full maturity load, so the metric is an upper bound on local bank absorption rather than a definitive answer.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $91.4mm
- … across this many loans
- 6
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $594.5mm
- Committed construction draws
- $253.3mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $377.1mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.24
- Rank, most strained
- 125
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.15
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 9
- … excluded from the calculation
- 7
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $554.8mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.24 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
125 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14260 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
7 local distress events in the past year (146 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-07-30
CLOSURE
Boise
2026-07-01
LAYOFF
53 jobs · Kuna
2026-01-31
CLOSURE
Nampa
2026-01-28
LAYOFF
51 jobs · Boise
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Boise
2025-12-06
CLOSURE
Garden City
2025-10-24
LAYOFF
42 jobs · Boise
2025-09-02
LAYOFF
201 jobs · Boise
2025-07-31
LAYOFF
111 jobs · Boise
2025-07-31
LAYOFF
28 jobs · Caldwell
2025-06-03
LAYOFF
75 jobs · Nampa
2025-04-08
LAYOFF
78 jobs · Meridian
2025-03-29
CLOSURE
Boise
2025-03-27
LAYOFF
135 jobs · Meridian
2024-12-31
CLOSURE
Boise
What has actually happened on the ground in Boise City, ID recently?
In the past 365 days, Boise City, ID has seen store closures of 3 and warn notices of 3, affecting 146 jobs, with 0 CRE bankruptcies reported in the state proxy during that window.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 3
- WARN layoff notices
- 3
- Jobs on those notices
- 146
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14260 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.