Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Birmingham, AL
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · AL
The read
$816M of CMBS across 33 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 12.9% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2027 ($261M, 32% of the book). Retail is the largest book ($362M, 0.0% distressed). 31 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,661 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Retail carries the book, but the filed distress rate is turning up
Birmingham runs an $816 million CMBS book across 33 loans, and the story on the page is a record that has been rising: the filed distress rate stood at 12.9% as of July 2026. That is a status the servicer has declared — loans in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent — not a projection, and the direction has been up. The metro still carries a healthy median debt-service coverage of 1.98, so the strain is concentrated rather than broad.
Retail is the largest slice at $362 million, and it is clean: 0.0% distressed against a national retail rate of 2.7%. The pressure sits elsewhere in the stack. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2027, with $261 million — 32% of the book — coming due. Further out, the smaller 2029 and 2031 vintages already carry filed distress of 21.1% and 92.1%, respectively, marking where the trouble is currently declared.
On the ground, the past year brought 31 distress events — 10 store closures and 21 layoff notices totaling 1,661 jobs. Unemployment was 3.5% in July 2026, up 0.7 points year over year. Among the 12 banks tracked here, two are flagged distressed and two more sit on early warning.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$119M / 14.6%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$324M
Local Banks (stressed)
2 / 12
Bank Early-Warning
2 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
10
Layoff Notices (1y)
21 / 1,661 jobs
0.38% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
33 / $816M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.5%
+0.7pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Birmingham, AL right now?
Here is the Birmingham, AL CRE distress read:
Birmingham, AL is showing broad-based distress: 3 of 4 signals are elevated, and 3 of 6 pairwise comparisons agree on stress while another 3 point to disagreement between mechanisms. Store closures are elevated at 13 closures (3.0 per 100k jobs), and layoff notices (WARN) are elevated at 23 notices (0.3% of employment). Bank CRE over the noncurrent line is elevated at $1,120.3mm, an 8.37% rate. The securitized tape reads quiet at 4 loans in special servicing, a 13.46% rate, but the disagreement is structural: retail is failing on buildings this tape does not hold, the lenders here are stressed on a book the tape cannot see, and employers are cutting while the securitized book has not moved. No legs are blind, so all six pairs are adjudicated, with three reading elevated on both sides and none reading quiet on both.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
13 closures | 3 per 100k jobs | 34 of 392 | 86 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
23 notices | 0.3% | 28 of 386 | 72 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$1.12bn | 8.37% | 40 of 393 | 88 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
4 loan records | 13.46% | 42 of 335 | 38 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 433639, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 550447, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 13378.0, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 884.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 13820 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Birmingham, AL, and which cannot be read?
In Birmingham, AL, the elevated distress signals are bank-distressed CRE (distressed lender CRE of $1.12bn), retail closures (13 store closures over 1 year), and WARN layoffs (23 notices in 1 year). The CRE-credit stress reading is still early: bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile is 51.3% of $13.38bn in bank CRE, while the CMBS special-servicing share of metro UPB is 13.5% ($119.0mm in special servicing). The reading on loan-count concentration is unavailable—only the UPB share is provided, not the number of CMBS loans in special servicing relative to the metro total.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $119.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 13.5%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $13.38bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 51.3%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $1.12bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $2.10bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 10.6%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 4
- Distressed banks
- 2
- Store closures (past year)
- 13
- WARN notices (past year)
- 23
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 13820 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.5%
+0.7pp yr
Last 24 months
2.2%3.7%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 433,639 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 14.6% distressed where its own property mix predicts 4.9% — $78M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+9.7pp
… and loan size held fixed
+10.0pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+4.6pp
most of the gap goes away once vintage is held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 6 loans, $192M, running 46.0% where the same type runs 11.2% elsewhere — worth 8.2pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$324M — 40% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 12.9% now (2026-07), +1.3pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $750M of the metro's $816M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$324M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 25 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$839M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.39× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$839M
After Committed Draws
$507M / −40%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.39×
Banks In Footprint
25 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $415M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $333M
comes out of the room above, leaving $507M,
with 6 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $83M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 of 25
is past it on drawn balances alone, and
13 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 25 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oakworth Capital Bank AL | 77.3% | 190% total 305%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Metro Bank AL | 77.0% | 187% total 222%
|
🔒 | 1.66% |
| Bryant Bank AL | 30.7% | 200% total 269%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| River Bank & Trust AL | 14.2% | 159% total 276%
|
🔒 | 0.31% |
| Central State Bank AL | 94.7% | 233% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First National Banker's Bank LA | 25.8% | 189% total 233%
|
🔒 | 1.00% |
| Evabank AL | 15.5% | 116% total 213%
|
🔒 | 0.35% |
| Peoples Bank Of Alabama AL | 23.3% | 215% total 299%
|
🔒 | 0.56% |
| Firstbank TN | 4.5% | 269% total 386%
|
🔒 | 0.97% |
| Citizens Trust Bank GA | 11.4% | 110% total 177%
|
🔒 | 1.62% |
| First Us Bank AL | 41.1% | 249% total 296%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Trustmark Bank MS | 1.7% | 237% total 298%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Community Bank Of Mississippi MS | 3.1% | 202% total 310%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Union State Bank AL | 71.2% | 227% total 312%
|
🔒 | 0.74% |
| West Alabama Bank & Trust AL | 4.3% | 151% total 248%
|
🔒 | 0.11% |
| Cb&s Bank, Inc. AL | 2.3% | 204% total 267%
|
🔒 | 0.94% |
| Marion Community Bank AL | 24.4% | 228% total 356%
|
🔒 | 2.39% |
| Robertson Banking Company AL | 12.2% | 255% total 330%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Bankfirst Financial Services MS | 1.1% | 219% total 317%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| Noblebank & Trust AL | 8.5% | 230% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Peoples Independent Bank AL | 4.6% | 182% total 230%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Bank Of Alabama AL | 2.7% | 244% total 327%
|
🔒 | 4.32% |
| Smartbank TN | 2.2% | 290% total 461%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Millennial Bank AL | 100.0% | 299% total 516%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Southpoint Bank AL | 66.5% | 350% total 534%
|
🔒 | 3.10% |
Not counted — 18 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Regions Bank AL · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Truist Bank NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · The Hometown Bank Of Alabama AL · Pinnacle Bank AL · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Traditions Bank AL · First Financial Bank AL
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First Horizon Bank TN · Pinnacle Bank TN · Renasant Bank MS · United Community Bank SC · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Woodforest National Bank TX · Servisfirst Bank AL · Valley National Bank NJ
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Commerceone Bank AL
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Hometown Bank Of Alabama | $59M | 53% total 75%
|
4.75% | 🔒 |
| Southpoint Bank | $577M | 350% total 534%
|
3.10% | 🔒 |
| First Financial Bank | $69M | 88% total 250%
|
2.61% | 🔒 |
| Metro Bank | $389M | 187% total 222%
|
1.66% | 🔒 |
| Servisfirst Bank | $9.4B | 307% total 429%
|
1.45% | 🔒 |
| Regions Bank | $16.3B | 65% total 97%
|
1.14% | 🔒 |
| Union State Bank | $66M | 227% total 312%
|
0.74% | 🔒 |
| First Us Bank | $340M | 249% total 296%
|
0.09% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Birmingham, AL have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Birmingham, AL’s refinancing capacity sits in the “slack” band, though the reading carries caveats. The metro has 25 banks qualifying for the analysis (with 9 excluded), leaving $506.8mm in room after committed draws of $415.4mm against a $323.7mm CMBS wall. The wall-to-room ratio is 0.64, ranking Birmingham 67 of 270 most strained metros; the ratio is above the median of 0.20, but the room is ample even before accounting for committed draws, which would lift capacity to a 0.39 ratio. The distressed share stands at 14.6%, but the wall is CMBS-only, and room is a proxy based on deposit footprints—so the banks likely have capacity to refinance the maturing balance here, though the strained rank partly reflects exclusion artifacts rather than credit events.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $323.7mm
- … across this many loans
- 9
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $839.5mm
- Committed construction draws
- $415.4mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $506.8mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.64
- Rank, most strained
- 67
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.39
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 25
- … excluded from the calculation
- 9
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 14.6%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $815.7mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.64 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
67 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 13820 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-29Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-0.1%
Same-Store Revenue
+0.8%
Occupancy
95.2%
Rent Growth
+1.9%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAA | -0.1% | +0.8% | 95.2% | +1.9% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
31 local distress events in the past year (1,661 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-08-20
LAYOFF
50 jobs · Blountsville
2026-08-04
LAYOFF
47 jobs · Hoover
2026-08-03
CLOSURE
Birmingham
2026-06-18
CLOSURE
Birmingham
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Birmingham
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Birmingham
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Birmingham
2026-04-23
LAYOFF
113 jobs · Pelham
2026-04-23
LAYOFF
113 jobs · Pelham
2026-02-27
LAYOFF
151 jobs · Bessemer
2026-02-27
LAYOFF
151 jobs · Bessemer
2026-02-19
LAYOFF
10 jobs · Birmingham
2026-02-19
LAYOFF
10 jobs · Birmingham
2026-02-10
LAYOFF
44 jobs · Birmingham
2026-02-10
LAYOFF
54 jobs · Birmingham
What has actually happened on the ground in Birmingham, AL recently?
In the past 365 days, Birmingham, AL has recorded 13 store closures and 21 WARN notices, affecting 1661 jobs. Notably, the reading for CRE bankruptcies is unavailable, as the figure is a state proxy rather than a metro-native count. The jobs figure is a floor, since notices without a stated headcount are counted but contribute zero jobs.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 13
- WARN layoff notices
- 21
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,661
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 13820 · geo_events · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.