Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Baton Rouge, LA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · LA
The read
$819M of CMBS across 36 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 7.7% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2027 ($301M, 37% of the book). Retail is the largest book ($444M, 0.0% distressed). 2 on-the-ground distress events in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Retail carries the book clean, but the filed record is turning up
Baton Rouge runs a compact $819 million CMBS book across 36 loans, and the distress reading in the filed record has been rising — 7.7% as of July 2026. That is the number to watch here, because the metro's largest exposure looks calm underneath it: retail is the biggest sector at $444 million and sits at 0.0% distressed, against a 2.7% national rate. The current cushion is real, but it is not the whole story.
The pressure point is timing. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2027, when $301 million — 37% of the entire book — comes due. That concentration is what makes the rising trend worth respecting rather than dismissing, even with median DSCR at a healthy 1.72. A book that has to refinance a large slug in a single year has less room to absorb a soft patch.
On the ground, the signal is quiet so far: two store closures over the past year and no reported layoff notices, with metro unemployment at 4.1% in July 2026. For now the distress is showing up in the servicer record more than on the street — a divergence worth tracking as the 2027 wall approaches.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$68M / 8.3%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$375M
Local Banks (stressed)
1 / 12
Bank Early-Warning
5 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
2
Layoff Notices (1y)
0 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
36 / $819M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.1%
-0.4pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Baton Rouge, LA right now?
For Baton Rouge, LA, the distress picture is mixed and depends heavily on which lens you use. Two of the four core feeds show clear elevation: bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line sits at 479.1 $mm (a 6.08% rate, ranking 65th by count), and securitized loans in special servicing shows 6 rows (7.64% of the securitized balance read here, ranking 28th by count). The other two are quiet: store closures registered only 2 closures (0.6 per 100k jobs), and layoff notices (WARN) show 0 notices (0.0% of employment). The broader verdict is that lender-side stress outpaces visible tenant or employment distress — 4 of 6 paired legs disagree, pointing to bank and CMBS pressure without a corresponding wave of retail or workforce failures. This reads less like a vacancy-driven story and more like balance-sheet strain, possibly tied to construction or rate resets rather than operating fundamentals.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
2 closures | 0.6 per 100k jobs | 179 of 392 | 295 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
0 notices | 0% | 313 of 386 | 308 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$479.1mm | 6.08% | 65 of 393 | 124 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
6 loan records | 7.64% | 28 of 335 | 58 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 333675, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 417597, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 7878.8, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 890.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12940 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Baton Rouge, LA, and which cannot be read?
In Baton Rouge, LA, the elevated distress signals are bank distressed CRE and CMBS special servicing. Specifically, bank distressed CRE stands at $479.1mm, with bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile ( 19.2% ), while CMBS special servicing UPB is $68.0mm ( 7.6% of metro UPB). The reading on other signals is unavailable: there is no stated figure for store closures, WARN notices, or overall market fundamentals, so those cannot be read from the provided data.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $68.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 7.6%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $7.88bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 19.2%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $479.1mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.30bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 12.9%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 6
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 2
- WARN notices (past year)
- 0
an isolated signal, not a convergence
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12940 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.1%
-0.4pp yr
Last 24 months
3.5%4.7%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 333,675 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 8.3% distressed where its own property mix predicts 3.3% — $41M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+5.0pp
… and loan size held fixed
+5.2pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+4.8pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Multifamily: 7 loans, $141M, running 31.3% where the same type runs 7.6% elsewhere — worth 4.1pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$375M — 46% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 7.7% now (2026-07), +1.6pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $732M of the metro's $819M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$375M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 27 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.9B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.20× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.9B
After Committed Draws
$1.3B / −33%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.20×
Banks In Footprint
27 / 2 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $652M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $629M
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.3B,
with 5 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $23M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
5 of 27
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
11 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 27 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hancock Whitney Bank MS | 14.1% | 146% total 229%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Investar Bank, National Association LA | 45.8% | 204% total 317%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| B1bank LA | 27.6% | 241% total 352%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| Red River Bank LA | 20.0% | 155% total 249%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Bank Of Zachary LA | 100.0% | 177% total 277%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Cottonport Bank LA | 41.7% | 118% total 217%
|
🔒 | 0.79% |
| First National Banker's Bank LA | 30.1% | 189% total 233%
|
🔒 | 1.00% |
| Landmark Bank LA | 100.0% | 103% total 249%
|
🔒 | 2.56% |
| First American Bank And Trust LA | 12.5% | 105% total 159%
|
🔒 | 1.10% |
| Synergy Bank LA | 26.2% | 206% total 316%
|
🔒 | 1.99% |
| Bank Of St. Francisville LA | 100.0% | 214% total 366%
|
🔒 | 0.36% |
| Feliciana Bank & Trust Company LA | 100.0% | 141% total 237%
|
🔒 | 0.89% |
| Gulf Coast Bank And Trust Company LA | 5.4% | 175% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.67% |
| First Guaranty Bank LA | 12.7% | 235% total 325%
|
🔒 | 2.88% |
| Currency Bank LA | 49.6% | 167% total 258%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Citizens Bank & Trust Company LA | 100.0% | 272% total 372%
|
🔒 | 0.69% |
| Home Bank, National Association LA | 3.5% | 208% total 377%
|
🔒 | 0.96% |
| Bankplus MS | 2.1% | 235% total 371%
|
🔒 | 0.63% |
| South Louisiana Bank LA | 2.0% | 111% total 183%
|
🔒 | 0.46% |
| United Community Bank LA | 40.9% | 290% total 372%
|
🔒 | 0.76% |
| Concordia Bank & Trust Company LA | 2.8% | 131% total 305%
|
🔒 | 3.69% |
| The First National Bank Of Jeanerette LA | 7.5% | 238% total 387%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| United Mississippi Bank MS | 4.4% | 178% total 310%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| Bonvenu Bank, National Association LA | 0.7% | 274% total 387%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| First National Bank Of Louisiana LA | 0.2% | 184% total 307%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Louisiana National Bank LA | 14.8% | 370% total 545%
|
🔒 | 2.07% |
| Resource Bank LA | 1.7% | 347% total 443%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
Not counted — 13 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Capital One, National Association VA · Regions Bank AL · M C Bank & Trust Company LA · Anthem Bank & Trust LA · Guaranty Bank And Trust Company LA · Patterson State Bank LA · Fidelity Bank LA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First Horizon Bank TN · Renasant Bank MS · Liberty Bank And Trust Company LA · Woodforest National Bank TX
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Plaquemine Bank & Trust Company LA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Guaranty Bank And Trust Company | $79M | 97% total 168%
|
3.66% | 🔒 |
| Feliciana Bank & Trust Company | $50M | 141% total 237%
|
0.89% | 🔒 |
| Citizens Bank & Trust Company | $223M | 272% total 372%
|
0.69% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Zachary | $150M | 177% total 277%
|
0.12% | 🔒 |
| Currency Bank | $84M | 167% total 258%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Landmark Bank | $66M | 103% total 249%
|
2.56% | 🔒 |
| First National Banker's Bank | $398M | 189% total 233%
|
1.00% | 🔒 |
| B1bank | $3.6B | 241% total 352%
|
0.84% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Baton Rouge, LA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
For Baton Rouge, LA, the wall-to-room ratio is 0.30, which is ABOVE the median of 0.20, indicating this metro is more strained than the typical ranked metro — placing it at 117 of 270 ranked metros (counting from the MOST strained). Local banks have $1.27bn in room after committed draws against a $375.4mm maturing CMBS wall, so the capacity reading is slack (well under 1.0). However, this ratio is an upper bound: the wall is CMBS-only, not the full maturity load, and deposit footprint is only a proxy for lending footprint. With 27 banks qualifying and 5 excluded (nationals/charter banks that don't report local deposits), the reading isn't an exclusion artifact, but the 8.3% distressed share and 8 maturing loans suggest some individual credit risk. Overall, local banks appear to have room to absorb this wall, though capacity is a proxy, not a certainty.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $375.4mm
- … across this many loans
- 8
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.90bn
- Committed construction draws
- $651.7mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.27bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.30
- Rank, most strained
- 117
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.20
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 27
- … excluded from the calculation
- 5
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 8.3%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $818.8mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.30 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
117 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12940 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
2 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2025-12-07
CLOSURE
Baton Rouge
2025-10-31
CLOSURE
Baton Rouge
2025-06-11
LAYOFF
90 jobs · Baton Rouge
2025-06-11
LAYOFF
90 jobs · 2950 College Drive Baton Rouge
2025-05-31
LAYOFF
50 jobs · Baton Rouge
2025-05-31
LAYOFF
50 jobs · 8322 Bluebonnet Baton Rouge
2025-04-07
LAYOFF
212 jobs
2025-04-07
LAYOFF
212 jobs
2025-04-07
LAYOFF
212 jobs · Baton Rouge
2024-11-06
CLOSURE
Gonzales
2024-11-06
CLOSURE
Prairieville
2024-10-31
CLOSURE
Baton Rouge
What has actually happened on the ground in Baton Rouge, LA recently?
On the ground in Baton Rouge, LA over the past 365 days, activity has been minimal but not absent. There were 2 store closures recorded, while 0 commercial-real-estate bankruptcies and 0 WARN layoff notices were filed. As a result, 0 jobs were affected by those layoff notices — though that figure is a floor, since notices with no stated headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. Notably, the bankruptcy count uses a state proxy, so it is not a metro-native tally, and the closure figure only includes approved, ZIP-matched rows. Unavailable: any broader commercial-real-estate market reading (e.g., vacancies or leasing) is not provided in this dataset.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 2
- WARN layoff notices
- 0
- Jobs on those notices
- 0
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12940 · geo_events · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.