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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · GA
The read
$4.8B of CMBS across 271 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 3.6% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($1.3B, 27% of the book). 108 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (9,119 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Atlanta's record turns as 2029 stacks up the paper
Atlanta carries $4.8 billion of CMBS across 271 loans, and the filed record is turning: distress has risen to 3.6% as of July 2026, up from the 3.1% logged on the book. That is still a measured number for a metro this size, and the median DSCR of 1.7 says most of the paper is covering itself. But the direction is the story — the servicer-declared rate is moving the wrong way, and the on-the-ground ledger backs it up: 108 distress events over the past year, split between 53 store closures and 55 layoff notices totaling 9,119 jobs, against a local unemployment rate of 3.4% that has eased 0.2 point over the year.
The maturity wall is where the pressure concentrates. The heaviest load lands in 2029, $1.3 billion, or 27% of the book, and that vintage already carries a 3.8% distress rate. Another $1.0 billion comes due within 24 months, with $1.0 billion stacked in 2028 and $1.1 billion in 2031 — the latter clean at 0.0% for now. Across the bank channel, the footprint is smaller and calmer: of 20 lenders, one is distressed and five sit on early-warning watch.
By sector, the book leans retail ($1.2 billion) and hospitality ($0.9 billion), with multifamily ($0.8 billion), industrial ($0.7 billion) and office ($0.6 billion) behind. Office is the thinnest slice here, which matters when the national office distress rate stands at 11.1% — Atlanta simply has less of that exposure to absorb. The national marks frame the rest: hospitality runs 6.2% and multifamily 7.9% nationally, against retail at 2.6% and industrial at 2.7%. For desks underwriting this metro, the watch items are clear — the rising filed rate and the 2029 concentration.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$146M / 3.1%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$973M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
1 / 20
Bank Early-Warning
5 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
53
Layoff Notices (1y)
55 / 9,119 jobs
0.36% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
271 / $4.8B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.4%
-0.2pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA right now?
For Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA, commercial real estate distress is elevated across all four independent feeds, with all 6 of 6 possible pairings agreeing on heightened stress. Store closures number 44 over the trailing year, ranking 9th of 392 metros by count but only 197th by rate at 1.74 closures per 100,000 jobs—a reading that is elevated by the metro's size rather than by per-unit stress. Layoff notices (WARN) total 70, ranking 12th of 386 by count and 68th by rate at 0.31% of metro employment. Bank CRE over the noncurrent line sits at $3,477.3 million, ranking 16th of 393 by count and 95th by rate at 7.83%, though this figure is allocated by branch deposits and cannot be fully confirmed. Securitized loans in special servicing number 11 rows, ranking 16th of 335 by count and 76th by rate at 4.2% of the securitized balance read here. The single size-driven caveat applies only to the closures leg; all three other legs show genuine rate-based elevation alongside strong count rankings. No pairs disagree, and none are unadjudicated due to blindness—so the distress signal is broad-based and mutually reinforcing across tenant operations, employer headcount, bank balance sheets, and securitized trust paper.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
44 closures | 1.74 per 100k jobs | 9 of 392 | 197 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
70 notices | 0.31% | 12 of 386 | 68 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$3.48bn | 7.83% | 16 of 393 | 95 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
11 loan records | 4.2% | 16 of 335 | 76 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 2,530,649 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 3,252,603 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $44,436.6 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-03-31).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $4,551.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-07-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12060 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA, and which cannot be read?
In Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA, the elevated distress signals are bank distressed CRE exposure, CMBS special servicing, store closures, and WARN notices. Specifically, bank CRE at the 90th percentile is 27.1%, with bank CRE 7.7% allocated to distressed lender exposure totaling $3.48bn, while CMBS special servicing UPB is $191.0mm (a 4.2% share of metro UPB). Additionally, there are 44 store closures and 70 WARN notices over the past year. The reading for distressed banks (count: 0 and assets $0.00bn) is unavailable as a distress signal since none are present, and the analyst should note that no elevated bank-level default figure is cited here beyond the at-risk percentage.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $191.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 4.2%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $44.44bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 27.1%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $3.48bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 7.7%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 11
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 44
- WARN notices (past year)
- 70
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12060 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.4%
-0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
2.8%3.8%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 2,530,649 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 3.1% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.4% — $112M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 2 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-2.3pp
… and loan size held fixed
-2.0pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-2.6pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Hospitality: 56 loans, $885M, where the same type runs 6.4% elsewhere. Its own rate and its part of the gap are not shown: fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$973M — 20% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 3.6% now (2026-07), +2.5pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.9B of the metro's $4.8B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$973M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 39 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.8B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.53× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.8B
After Committed Draws
$684M / −62%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.53×
Banks In Footprint
39 / 8 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.8B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.1B
comes out of the room above, leaving $684M,
with 19 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $680M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
8 of 39
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
16 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
2% of the room above sits at banks we could not
match to a commitment filing; they are left out of this deduction rather than assumed to have promised nothing.
Counted — 39 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ameris Bank GA | 40.0% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| United Bank GA | 66.6% | 124% total 172%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Citizens Trust Bank GA | 85.8% | 110% total 177%
|
🔒 | 1.62% |
| Affinity Bank, National Association GA | 100.0% | 220% total 360%
|
🔒 | 0.46% |
| Community Bank Of Pickens County GA | 100.0% | 211% total 399%
|
🔒 | 2.42% |
| The Citizens Bank Of Georgia GA | 100.0% | 200% total 292%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Coastal States Bank SC | 38.1% | 238% total 331%
|
🔒 | 1.53% |
| Bank Of Madison GA | 100.0% | 207% total 277%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| First National Bank Of Griffin GA | 100.0% | 196% total 258%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Southern First Bank SC | 14.3% | 236% total 397%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| Craft Bank GA | 100.0% | 218% total 330%
|
🔒 | 0.98% |
| Firstbank TN | 6.4% | 269% total 386%
|
🔒 | 0.97% |
| Georgia Banking Company GA | 100.0% | 290% total 370%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| American Commerce Bank, National Association GA | 87.1% | 257% total 369%
|
🔒 | 3.03% |
| Hometrust Bank NC | 7.9% | 235% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Shinhan Bank America NY | 26.2% | 257% total 382%
|
🔒 | 0.88% |
| First Peoples Bank GA | 36.9% | 205% total 321%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| New Millennium Bank NJ | 10.7% | 168% total 294%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Vallant Bank GA | 12.7% | 264% total 397%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| First National Community Bank GA | 21.0% | 225% total 384%
|
🔒 | 0.51% |
| Banksouth GA | 14.4% | 247% total 303%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Seacoast National Bank FL | 0.7% | 230% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Promiseone Bank GA | 76.3% | 284% total 364%
|
🔒 | 1.01% |
| Bankunited, National Association FL | 0.3% | 194% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| Capital City Bank FL | 1.0% | 122% total 193%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Colony Bank GA | 5.9% | 278% total 392%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| Oconee State Bank GA | 11.7% | 248% total 482%
|
🔒 | 3.83% |
| First American Bank And Trust Company GA | 23.3% | 293% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Legacy State Bank GA | 100.0% | 294% total 452%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Farmers And Merchants Bank GA | 9.0% | 285% total 389%
|
🔒 | 1.54% |
| Bank Of Dudley GA | 0.9% | 278% total 436%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Hyperion Bank PA | 45.3% | 348% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.91% |
| First Community Bank SC | 10.3% | 316% total 473%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Wallis Bank TX | 9.2% | 419% total 676%
|
🔒 | 1.67% |
| Central Bank FL | 9.0% | 398% total 588%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| American Pride Bank GA | 6.1% | 431% total 502%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Carolina Bank NC | 3.8% | 448% total 515%
|
🔒 | 1.07% |
| Paragon Bank TN | 2.7% | 321% total 423%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| Pcb Bank CA | 1.9% | 304% total 471%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
Not counted — 38 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Truist Bank NC · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Rbc Bank, (Georgia) National Association GA · Regions Bank AL · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Cibc National Trust Company GA · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · The Huntington National Bank OH · The Northern Trust Company IL · Tib National Association TX · Beal Bank Usa NV · Fsnb, National Association OK · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Pinnacle Bank TN · Metro City Bank GA · United Community Bank SC · Bank Ozk AR · First Horizon Bank TN · East West Bank CA · Renasant Bank MS · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · City National Bank CA · Woori America Bank NY · Bank Of Hope CA · Woodforest National Bank TX · United Bank VA · Servisfirst Bank AL · Hanmi Bank CA
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Peoples Bank & Trust GA · Bank Of Monticello GA · Loyal Trust Bank GA · Embassy National Bank GA · Touchmark National Bank GA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| American Commerce Bank, National Association | $332M | 257% total 369%
|
3.03% | 🔒 |
| Community Bank Of Pickens County | $366M | 211% total 399%
|
2.42% | 🔒 |
| Touchmark National Bank | $283M | 387% total 510%
|
2.26% | 🔒 |
| Citizens Trust Bank | $197M | 110% total 177%
|
1.62% | 🔒 |
| Promiseone Bank | $332M | 284% total 364%
|
1.01% | 🔒 |
| Metro City Bank | $1.5B | 148% total 288%
|
0.47% | 🔒 |
| Craft Bank | $150M | 218% total 330%
|
0.98% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Monticello | $56M | 163% total 234%
|
0.35% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ranks 48 of 275, counting from the most strained, with a wall-to-room ratio of 1.42 against a maturing balance of $972.7mm across 75 loans; committed draws of $1.80bn cut available room to $684.3mm from $1.83bn, pushing the ratio to 1.42 from 0.53 before committed draws. That reading comes with 39 banks qualifying and 20 excluded here, so the strain may partly reflect an exclusion artifact rather than a credit event, and because the wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months rather than the metro's whole maturity load, the ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $972.7mm
- … across this many loans
- 75
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.83bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.80bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $684.3mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.42
- Rank, most strained
- 48
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.53
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 39
- … excluded from the calculation
- 20
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 3.1%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $4.75bn
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
1.42 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
48 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12060 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-2.7%
Same-Store Revenue
-0.2%
Occupancy
95.6%
Rent Growth
-0.6%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPT | -2.6% | +1.3% | 95.5% | +0.7% | 2026-07-30 |
| EQR | -6.2% | -2.0% | 96.2% | -2.6% | 2026-04-28 |
| MAA | +0.6% | 0.0% | 95.2% | 0.0% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
108 local distress events in the past year (9,119 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-11-16
LAYOFF
Scheduled · 95 jobs · Austell
2026-10-24
LAYOFF
95 jobs · Bowdon
2026-10-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-19
CLOSURE
Chamblee
2026-10-19
LAYOFF
78 jobs · Atlanta
2026-10-19
LAYOFF
321 jobs · Atlanta
2026-10-19
LAYOFF
157 jobs · Atlanta
2026-10-12
CLOSURE
Sandy Springs
2026-10-09
CLOSURE
Atlanta
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-05
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-05
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
What has actually happened on the ground in Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA metro shows 52 approved store closures and 56 WARN notices, with 9,254 jobs affected across those notices — a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. Separately, the 80 CRE-likely bankruptcies figure is a STATE PROXY rather than a metro-native count, counting filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in, and coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 52
- WARN layoff notices
- 56
- Jobs on those notices
- 9,254
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 80
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12060 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
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Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
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CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
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