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The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →

A Clean Filed Record in Ann Arbor, With 2027 the Year to Circle

Ann Arbor carries $469M of CMBS across 29 loans, and by the measure that matters to a servicer, the book is quiet: distress sits at 0.0% as of July 2026, and the filed record has been flat. There is no special-servicing or 60-plus-day story to tell here yet, and a median DSCR of 1.71 says the performing loans are covering their debt with room to spare.

The pressure point, such as it is, sits on the calendar. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2027, when $131M — 28% of the book — comes due, with the balance spread across 2029, 2030 and 2031. Every one of those maturity years shows a 0.0% distress rate today, so the question is refinancing capacity into those windows, not current delinquency.

Below the loan tape, the on-the-ground record is thin but not blank: six distress events over the past year, five of them store closures and one layoff notice accounting for 76 jobs. Office-using employment is off 4.3% year over year even as the metro's unemployment rate eased to 4.2%. For now the securitized book and the local economy are telling a consistent story — steady — and 2027 is the date to keep on the desk.

CMBS Distressed UPB

under $1M / 0.0% in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent

CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo

$153M

Local Banks (stressed)

0 / 3

Bank Early-Warning

1 flagged

Store Closures (1y)

5

Layoff Notices (1y)

1 / 76 jobs 0.06% of metro employment

CMBS Loans / UPB

29 / $469M

Unemployment · Jul 2026

4.2% -0.7pp yr

Office-Using Jobs · 2024

34,305 -4.3% yr

How much CRE distress is there in Ann Arbor, MI right now?

Ann Arbor’s distress signals are mostly quiet across measurable legs: 0 of the 4 signals read elevated, and 3 of the 6 possible paired crossings agree on quiet, with the remaining 3 pairs unadjudicated because a side is blind. However, securitized loans in special servicing cannot be read here—their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT, not evidence of no distress. Among measured legs, store closures stand at 5 closures at a rate of 3.74 per 100k jobs (rank 83 by count, 61 by rate of 392); layoff notices at 1 notice, a rate of 0.04% of employment (rank 212 by count of 386); and bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line at $178.0mm, a 6.69% share (rank 124 of 393). The CMBS leg is unmeasurable, so its distress level is unavailable. Overall, this is a low-stress read where measurement is possible, but the blind leg means the full picture is incomplete.

The figures behind this answer

Signal	Level	Rate	Rank by count	Rank by rate	Reading
store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs	5 closures	3.74 per 100k jobs	83 of 392	61 of 392	quiet trailing 365 days to today
layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment	1 notices	0.04%	212 of 386	210 of 386	quiet trailing 365 days to today
bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line	$178.0mm	6.69%	124 of 393	112 of 393	quiet allocated 2026-03-31
securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing	1 loan records	—	—	—	cannot be read not measurable 2026-07-29

6 pairs compared 0 both elevated 3 both quiet 0 disagreeing 3 unreadable — a side is blind 0 of four legs elevated blind: securitized loans in special servicing

one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator

{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}

{'fork': 'a blind leg is not a quiet one', 'note': 'securitized loans in special servicing cannot be read here. Their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT.'}

{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 133668, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}

{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 183743, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}

{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 2662.3, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}

{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 465.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}

Written from the figures above · CBSA 11460 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026 · Ask your own question →

Which distress signals are elevated in Ann Arbor, MI, and which cannot be read?

Ann Arbor, MI is currently in a "watch" phase, with no elevated distress signals identified. The bank-side reading shows CRE exposure of $2.66bn (5.8% allocation), with 10.0% of that at risk at the 90th percentile; however, distressed lender CRE stands at $178.0mm and the number of distressed banks is zero. On the securitized side, the CMBS special servicing reading of $0.0mm (0.0% of metro UPB) is unavailable as a true measure — the tape carries one loan in special servicing with no balance, so the figure represents a data gap rather than an absence of distress. Store closures (5) and WARN notices (1) are present but not credit-material, and the reading overall is "thin," with materiality deemed "immaterial."

The figures behind this answer

CMBS in special servicing: $0.0mm
… as a share of this metro's CMBS balance: 0.0%
Bank CRE lent into this metro: $2.66bn
… at risk at the 90th percentile: 10.0%
CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: $178.0mm
Assets at those lenders: $0.00bn
… share needing no branch-deposit allocation: 5.8%
Legs agreeing: 0
Phase: watch
CMBS loans in special servicing: 1
Distressed banks: 0
Store closures (past year): 5
WARN notices (past year): 1

an isolated signal, not a convergence

little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; and the securitized side is NOT MEASURED here — all 1 loans in special servicing sit on tape rows carrying no balance, so the $0 is a gap in the tape, not an absence of distress

signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy

Written from the figures above · CBSA 11460 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026 · Ask your own question →

Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →

Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing. This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent; office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two. That lag is the whole point of looking here.

Unemployment · Jul 2026

4.2% -0.7pp yr

Last 24 months

3.5%4.9%

Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is, about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is falling are not telling you the same thing.

Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024

Office-using

34,305 jobs · -4.3% yr · 26% of all jobs

Retail trade

15,024 jobs · -0.9% yr

Industrial

4,348 jobs · +2.6% yr

Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 133,668 jobs in the metro). QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose. Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means “suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”

Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →

This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.8% — $32M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not.

No CMBS sector data for this metro.

Elimination — does the gap survive a control?

Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.

property mix alone

-6.8pp

… and loan size held fixed

-7.2pp

the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too

… and vintage held fixed

-6.4pp

the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too

The largest single contributor is Multifamily: 8 loans, $164M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 7.7% elsewhere — worth 2.7pp of this metro's own rate.

Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →

$153M — 33% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.

2027

$131M · 6 loans · 0.0%

2028

$45M · 4 loans · 0.0%

2029

$67M · 6 loans · 0.0%

2030

$97M · 6 loans · 0.0%

2031

$60M · 3 loans · 0.0%

2033

$36M · 1 loan · 0.0%

2034

$34M · 3 loans · 0.0%

Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →

Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.

Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.

Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.

Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →

The top three submarkets hold $461M of the metro's $469M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.

Downtown Ann Arbor

$215M · 0.0%

Ann Arbor-Saline / Briarwood

$185M · 0.0%

Ypsilanti

$61M · 0.0%

Dexter / Chelsea

$5M · 0.0%

Saline / Milan

$3M · 0.0%

Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →

$153M of CMBS matures here within two years. The 5 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly $386M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is 0.40× that room. The median metro sits at 0.12×.

Regional Bank Room

$386M

After Committed Draws

$275M / −29%

Maturing ÷ Room

0.40×

Banks In Footprint

5 / 0 at the line

The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs — every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks have $131M of construction committed and not yet advanced, of which $111M comes out of the room above, leaving $275M, with 2 banks whose entire remaining room is spoken for. A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net across balance sheets — so $20M of what has been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws. SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land: 2 more cross it once their own commitments fund.

Counted — 5 regional & local CRE lenders

Bank	Deposit share	CRE / Capital*	Room contributed	Noncurrent CRE
Bank Of Ann Arbor MI	58.7%	212% total 294%	🔒	0.20%
Chelsea State Bank MI	99.9%	105% total 264%	🔒	2.01%
First Merchants Bank IN	1.2%	183% total 243%	🔒	0.59%
Bank Michigan MI	26.1%	274% total 446%	🔒	0.08%
Northstar Bank MI	15.5%	298% total 548%	🔒	0.92%

Not counted — 10 banks with deposits here

These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.

no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender

Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · The Huntington National Bank OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Keybank National Association OH · University Bank MI · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Citizens Bank, National Association RI

national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends

Old National Bank IN · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY

* Two ratios, two perimeters. The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital — construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its 300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on. Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.

How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local bank sector could absorb if it were the only door. Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held (SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share. Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 — the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show. Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded — 313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.

Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →

Bank	Total CRE	CRE / Capital*	Noncurrent CRE	Early Warning
University Bank	$158M	79% total 133%	0.36%	🔒
Chelsea State Bank	$149M	105% total 264%	2.01%	🔒
Bank Of Ann Arbor	$1.4B	212% total 294%	0.20%	🔒

* Two ratios, two perimeters. The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital — construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its 300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on. Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.

Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.

Do the banks lending in Ann Arbor, MI have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?

Ann Arbor, MI shows slack capacity for its CMBS refinancing wall: with 5 qualifying banks (2 excluded here), the metro has $275.5mm of room after committed draws against a $153.2mm maturing balance across 8 loans, for a wall-to-room ratio of 0.56 — above the 0.20 median, ranking 74 of 270 from most strained. The distressed share is 0.0%, and the ratio is not an exclusion artifact, but note the wall captures only CMBS maturing in 24 months, and room is a proxy based on deposit footprint.

The figures behind this answer

CMBS maturing in the window: $153.2mm
… across this many loans: 8
Local bank room, before committed draws: $386.0mm
Committed construction draws: $130.7mm
Local bank room, after those draws: $275.5mm
Wall-to-room ratio: 0.56
Rank, most strained: 74
… out of this many metros ranked: 270
… before committed draws: 0.40
Population ranked against: CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
Qualifying local banks: 5
… excluded from the calculation: 2
Distressed share of this metro's CMBS: 0.0%
Total CMBS balance here: $469.0mm
Capacity band: slack

Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of 0.20 across the ranked metros.

0.56 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro

74 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain

{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}

Written from the figures above · CBSA 11460 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026 · Ask your own question →

On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →

6 local distress events in the past year (76 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.

2026-05-03

CLOSURE

Buffalo Wild Wings

Ann Arbor

2026-04-06

BANKRUPTCY

Ryan Leestma

CRE-linked bankruptcy

2026-04-06

BANKRUPTCY

Muskegon Adelaide Pointe

CRE-linked bankruptcy

2026-03-09

LAYOFF

Labcorp Early Development Laboratories, Inc., and Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (“Labcorp”)

76 jobs · Ann Arbor

2025-12-31

CLOSURE

JoAnn

Ann Arbor

2025-12-31

CLOSURE

JoAnn

Ypsilanti

2025-09-30

CLOSURE

At Home

Ypsilanti

2025-09-30

CLOSURE

At Home

Ypsilanti

2025-05-31

LAYOFF

Concordia University, Inc.

41 jobs · Ann Arbor

2025-02-28

CLOSURE

Sephora (LVMH)

Ann Arbor

2024-10-31

CLOSURE

Marco's Pizza

Ann Arbor

2024-02-15

LAYOFF

May Mobility

Ann Arbor

2023-04-07

LAYOFF

Workit Health

100 jobs · Ann Arbor

2023-02-23

LAYOFF

Merative

200 jobs · Ann Arbor

What has actually happened on the ground in Ann Arbor, MI recently?

Ann Arbor, MI has seen relatively limited but measurable commercial real estate stress over the past 365 days. There has been 5 store closure approved on a metro-native basis, alongside 1 WARN notice affecting at least 76 jobs (a floor, as notices without a stated headcount contribute 0 to this figure). Broader distress is reflected in 3 CRE-likely bankruptcy filings in the states this metro’s collateral sits in (state proxy, not metro-native), while layoff and closure details are filtered by ZIP-to-CBSA matching and approved rows only. A clean metro-specific closure or layoff total beyond these approved counts is unavailable, given the data’s reliance on approved filings and the noted state-level proxy for bankruptcies.

The figures behind this answer

Store closures: 5
WARN layoff notices: 1
Jobs on those notices: 76
CRE-related bankruptcies: 3
Window, in days: 365

STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.

affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.

Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').

Written from the figures above · CBSA 11460 · geo_events · last changed 27 Aug 2026 · Ask your own question →

Commercial Real Estate Credit —Ann Arbor, MI

How much CRE distress is there in Ann Arbor, MI right now?

Which distress signals are elevated in Ann Arbor, MI, and which cannot be read?

Do the banks lending in Ann Arbor, MI have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?

What has actually happened on the ground in Ann Arbor, MI recently?

Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Ann Arbor, MI