Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · PA, NJ
The read
$710M of CMBS across 31 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($309M, 44% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.6% as of 2026-07. 19 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (924 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
A Quiet Book, a 2029 Cliff, and Layoffs the Servicer Hasn't Logged
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton carries a modest $710 million of CMBS across 31 loans, and by the measure the servicer actually files, it is one of the calmer books in the region. The distress rate sits at 0.6% as of July 2026, and it has been flat — no new specially serviced or 60-plus-day delinquent paper has moved the needle. Median DSCR of 1.51 says the performing loans are covering with room to spare.
The pressure, such as it is, sits in the calendar rather than in the delinquency column. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, when $309 million — 44% of the entire book — comes due, with another slug in 2027. None of it is distressed today, but it concentrates the refinancing question into a single year.
What the filed record does not capture is the ground. The metro logged 19 distress events over the past year — 7 store closures and 12 layoff notices totaling 924 jobs — even as headline unemployment eased to 4.1%, down 0.9 points year over year. That gap between a clean CMBS tape and real economic churn is the tension worth watching here.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$4M / 0.6%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$274M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 8
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
7
Layoff Notices (1y)
12 / 924 jobs
0.28% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
31 / $710M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.1%
-0.9pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ right now?
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ shows a mixed distress picture across four independent feeds: 2 of the 4 signals are elevated, and the six pairwise comparisons split 1 agree-hot, 1 agree-quiet, and 4 disagreeing, with 0 pairs unadjudicated because a side is blind. On the elevated side, layoff notices (WARN) run at 11 notices, 0.19% of the metro's employment, ranking 52nd of 386 by count and 122nd by rate, while bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line sits at $526.3mm, 9.27% of the CRE lent into this metro, ranking 60th of 393 by count and 74th by rate. On the quiet side, store closures measure 5 closures, 1.5 per 100,000 jobs, ranking 83rd of 392 by count and 214th by rate, and securitized loans in special servicing total 1 row, 0.58% of the securitized balance, ranking 90th of 335 by count and 101st by rate. The disagreement pattern points to a large-employer event rather than a retail one (closures quiet vs. WARN hot), bank stress without a visible tenant cause (closures quiet vs. bank hot), employers cutting while the securitized book has not moved (WARN hot vs. tape quiet), and lenders stressed on a book the tape cannot see (bank hot vs. tape quiet). The one agree-hot pair (WARN + bank) and one agree-quiet pair (closures + tape) round out the read.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
5 closures | 1.5 per 100k jobs | 83 of 392 | 214 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
11 notices | 0.19% | 52 of 386 | 122 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$526.3mm | 9.27% | 60 of 393 | 74 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
1 loan records | 0.58% | 90 of 335 | 101 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 332778, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 450068, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 5675.2, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 685.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 10900 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ, and which cannot be read?
For Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ, elevated distress signals are centered on bank distressed CRE and WARN notices. Bank distressed CRE is elevated at $526.3mm — the only distressed-lender measure where a material exposure is detectable, even though the count of distressed banks is 0. WARN notices are elevated at 11 over the past year, alongside 5 store closures, signaling real-economy deterioration. The CMBS special servicing reading is minimal at $4.0mm and 0.6% of metro UPB, which is not elevated. Bank CRE at risk stands at 32.2% of bank CRE allocations (31.8% of the metro’s $5.68bn bank CRE book), but the materiality of distressed dollars behind these signals is immaterial, indicating the ground is wobbling without a CRE-credit hit yet. A direct measure of the 90th-percentile distress threshold is unavailable for this metro, as is the count of distressed banks (reported as 0, not elevated), and no other figure beyond those cited can be read from the provided data.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $4.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.6%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $5.68bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 32.2%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $526.3mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 31.8%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 1
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 5
- WARN notices (past year)
- 11
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 10900 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.1%
-0.9pp yr
Last 24 months
3.7%5.5%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 332,778 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.6% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.2% — $32M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-4.6pp
… and loan size held fixed
-3.5pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-5.7pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 6 loans, $109M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 11.3% elsewhere — worth 1.7pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$274M — 39% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.6% now (2026-07), +0.6pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $655M of the metro's $710M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$274M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 19 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.0B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.26× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.0B
After Committed Draws
$682M / −35%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.26×
Banks In Footprint
19 / 3 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $437M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $359M
comes out of the room above, leaving $682M,
with 6 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $78M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
5 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 19 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fulton Bank, National Association PA | 7.4% | 184% total 283%
|
🔒 | 0.79% |
| Embassy Bank For The Lehigh Valley PA | 100.0% | 177% total 227%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| New Tripoli Bank PA | 100.0% | 142% total 288%
|
🔒 | 0.87% |
| First Northern Bank And Trust Company PA | 55.7% | 167% total 216%
|
🔒 | 1.85% |
| The Fidelity Deposit And Discount Bank PA | 22.4% | 188% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Mauch Chunk Trust Company PA | 72.8% | 168% total 206%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Unity Bank NJ | 15.0% | 237% total 440%
|
🔒 | 1.07% |
| First Hope Bank, A National Banking Association NJ | 69.1% | 229% total 378%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Jim Thorpe Neighborhood Bank PA | 100.0% | 183% total 188%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Firstrust Savings Bank PA | 4.1% | 245% total 306%
|
🔒 | 0.74% |
| Quaint Oak Bank PA | 22.2% | 232% total 503%
|
🔒 | 1.10% |
| Penn Community Bank PA | 2.7% | 229% total 278%
|
🔒 | 0.82% |
| Community Bank, National Association NY | 0.5% | 201% total 260%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Peoples Security Bank And Trust Company PA | 10.5% | 290% total 389%
|
🔒 | 0.33% |
| First Keystone Community Bank PA | 1.2% | 147% total 317%
|
🔒 | 3.46% |
| Univest Bank And Trust Co. PA | 0.9% | 264% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Qnb Bank PA | 18.8% | 332% total 436%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Provident Bank NJ | 1.5% | 422% total 526%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Mid Penn Bank PA | 0.5% | 328% total 438%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
Not counted — 13 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Truist Bank NC · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Td Bank, National Association DE · Keybank National Association OH · The Neffs National Bank PA · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Santander Bank, N.a. DE · Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY · Valley National Bank NJ
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
American Bank PA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Northern Bank And Trust Company | $308M | 167% total 216%
|
1.85% | 🔒 |
| New Tripoli Bank | $209M | 142% total 288%
|
0.87% | 🔒 |
| Mauch Chunk Trust Company | $122M | 168% total 206%
|
0.07% | 🔒 |
| Jim Thorpe Neighborhood Bank | $53M | 183% total 188%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| American Bank | $655M | 434% total 528%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Embassy Bank For The Lehigh Valley | $406M | 177% total 227%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| First Hope Bank, A National Banking Association | $277M | 229% total 378%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| The Neffs National Bank | $87M | 89% total 110%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ shows slack capacity for refinancing its maturing CRE. The metro’s wall-to-room ratio is 0.40, a reading that lands it at rank_most_strained of 87 of 270, counting from the most strained — meaning it is more strained than the typical ranked metro, though still comfortably above the median of 0.20. With maturing_bal of $274.6mm against room_after_committed of $682.4mm, the local bank pool appears able to absorb the CMBS wall, even after accounting for committed draws of $437.5mm. Note that this wall is CMBS-only and the room figure is a proxy tied to deposit footprints; four banks are excluded here, but the exclusion does not appear to drive the reading. The distressed share sits at 0.6%, suggesting limited stress among the maturing loans.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $274.6mm
- … across this many loans
- 6
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.04bn
- Committed construction draws
- $437.5mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $682.4mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.40
- Rank, most strained
- 87
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.26
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 19
- … excluded from the calculation
- 4
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.6%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $710.0mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.40 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
87 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 10900 · capacity_metro · last changed 06 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
19 local distress events in the past year (924 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-11-16
LAYOFF
52 jobs · Northampton
2026-10-16
LAYOFF
57 jobs · Lehigh
2026-09-30
LAYOFF
173 jobs · Lehigh
2026-08-17
LAYOFF
UPPER MACUNGIE Township
2026-08-05
LAYOFF
100 jobs · Allentown
2026-07-17
LAYOFF
176 jobs · Phillipsburg
2026-07-16
CLOSURE
Allentown
2026-06-30
LAYOFF
55 jobs · Lehigh
2026-03-31
CLOSURE
Coopersburg
2026-03-31
CLOSURE
Coopersburg
2026-02-28
LAYOFF
66 jobs · Northampton
2026-01-20
CLOSURE
Palmer Township
2026-01-20
CLOSURE
Palmer Township
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Bethlehem
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Whitehall
What has actually happened on the ground in Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ recently?
On the ground in Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ over the past 365 days, the data show 5 store closures and 11 WARN notices, affecting at least 872 jobs (a floor, as notices without headcounts contribute 0). There have been 0 CRE bankruptcies, though this uses a state proxy — bankruptcy filings are counted by the filer's state, not the property's location, so it is not a metro-native count and should be treated as a directional signal rather than a precise local reading. Note that closures and layoffs are matched by ZIP to the metro and only approved rows count, so these figures align with the Metro Pulse methodology, not the convergence board.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 5
- WARN layoff notices
- 11
- Jobs on those notices
- 872
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 10900 · geo_events · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.