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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · NY
The read
$452M of CMBS across 23 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2030 ($219M, 48% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-10. 26 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,786 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$18M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 6
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
9
Layoff Notices (1y)
17 / 1,786 jobs
0.51% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
23 / $452M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.8%
+0.1pp yr
Which distress signals are elevated in Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY, and which cannot be read?
In Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY, the elevated distress signals are closures and warn notices — with 7 store closures and 21 WARN notices over the past year — indicating a "real-economy signal" ahead of any CRE-credit event. However, on the credit side, the reading is either minimal or unavailable: bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile is 8.9% against a bank CRE allocation of 9.5% ($6.58bn), while CMBS special servicing is $0.0mm (0.0% of metro UPB) and distressed lender CRE is $0.0mm. The materiality of distressed CRE dollars is immaterial, as there are 0 distressed banks and 0 CMBS loans in special servicing, so the key question — which credit signals are elevated — yields no distress, only the real-economy signals of closures and WARN notices that cannot yet be read as CRE-credit stress.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $6.58bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 8.9%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $0.0mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 9.5%
- Signals reading elevated
- store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 0
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 7
- WARN notices (past year)
- 21
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 10580 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.8%
+0.1pp yr
Last 24 months
2.8%4.2%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 351,341 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Too few CMBS loans here (23) to say whether this metro's rate is explained by its property mix — that comparison needs 25.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$18M — 4% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-10), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $370M of the metro's $452M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$18M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 10 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$548M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.03× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$548M
After Committed Draws
$347M / −37%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.03×
Banks In Footprint
10 / 2 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $255M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $201M
comes out of the room above, leaving $347M,
with 4 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $54M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
2 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 10 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arrow Bank National Association NY | 22.4% | 142% total 195%
|
🔒 | 0.44% |
| Pioneer Bank, National Association NY | 97.3% | 236% total 274%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| First National Bank Of Scotia NY | 100.0% | 125% total 183%
|
🔒 | 2.85% |
| The Adirondack Trust Company NY | 93.5% | 261% total 337%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Ballston Spa National Bank NY | 75.6% | 272% total 334%
|
🔒 | 0.11% |
| Wayne Bank PA | 3.7% | 201% total 359%
|
🔒 | 2.24% |
| The Bank Of Greene County NY | 10.7% | 295% total 338%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| Chemung Canal Trust Company NY | 19.8% | 375% total 428%
|
🔒 | 0.14% |
| Beacon Bank And Trust MA | 2.2% | 336% total 412%
|
🔒 | 0.82% |
| Rhinebeck Bank NY | 0.0% | 250% total 337%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
Not counted — 10 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Keybank National Association OH · Trustco Bank NY · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Td Bank, National Association DE · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of Richmondville NY
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY · Nbt Bank, National Association NY · Community Bank, National Association NY
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ballston Spa National Bank | $490M | 272% total 334%
|
0.11% | 🔒 |
| First National Bank Of Scotia | $132M | 125% total 183%
|
2.85% | 🔒 |
| Trustco Bank | $234M | 28% total 39%
|
0.73% | 🔒 |
| The Adirondack Trust Company | $646M | 261% total 337%
|
0.57% | 🔒 |
| Pioneer Bank, National Association | $671M | 236% total 274%
|
0.30% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Yes. Albany-Schenectady-Troy carries a wall-to-room ratio of 0.05, and with $18.0mm maturing against $346.7mm of room after committed draws (from 10 qualifying banks, with 3 excluded here), the CMBS maturity load is small relative to local bank capacity; the ratio sits at rank 232 of 275 counting from the most strained, and distressed share is 0.0%, so the reading indicates slack rather than strain. Two caveats temper this: room is a proxy built on deposit footprint rather than a measurement of lending, and the wall is CMBS-only, so this is an upper bound on what local banks would have to absorb rather than the metro's full maturity load.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $18.0mm
- … across this many loans
- 3
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $547.8mm
- Committed construction draws
- $254.7mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $346.7mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.05
- Rank, most strained
- 232
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.03
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 10
- … excluded from the calculation
- 3
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $451.9mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.05 is BELOW the median of 0.24, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
232 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 10580 · capacity_metro · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
26 local distress events in the past year (1,786 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-22
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-22
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-21
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-16
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-16
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-15
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-09-25
CLOSURE
Saratoga
2026-09-23
CLOSURE
Saratoga Springs
2026-08-25
LAYOFF
46 jobs · Broome
2026-08-11
LAYOFF
78 jobs · Albany
2026-07-26
CLOSURE
Halfmoon
2026-07-17
CLOSURE
Halfmoon
2026-06-30
LAYOFF
57 jobs · Nassau
What has actually happened on the ground in Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY metro recorded 9 store closures, 17 WARN notices, and 1,786 jobs affected, with the jobs figure being a floor since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute zero. The 140 CRE-likely bankruptcies are a STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 9
- WARN layoff notices
- 17
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,786
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 140
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 10580 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.